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FORWARD 
 
At the direction of the former Secretary of the Air Force (SAF), Dr. James G. Roche, the Air Force Institute of 
Technology (AFIT) established an Air Force Center for Systems Engineering (AFCSE) at its Wright-Patterson Air 
Force Base (WPAFB), Ohio, campus in 2002. The AFCSE was tasked to develop case studies focusing on the 
application of systems engineering principles within various aerospace programs. The intent of these case studies 
was to examine a broad spectrum of program types and a variety of learning principles using the Friedman-Sage 
Framework to guide overall analysis. In addition to this case, many other studies are available at the AFCSE web 
site, such as: 
 
• Global Positioning System (GPS) (space system) 
• Hubble Telescope (space system) 
• Theater Battle Management Core System (TBMCS) (complex software development) 
• F-111 Fighter (joint program with significant involvement by the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
[OSD]) 
• C-5 Cargo Airlifter (very large, complex aircraft) 
• International Space Station (highly complex multinational manned space system) 
• A-10 Attack Aircraft (competitive development of critical technologies) 
• Global Hawk (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance air system) 
 
These cases support academic instruction on systems engineering within military service academies and at both 
civilian and military graduate schools, as well as training programs in industry. Each case study is comprised of 
elements of success, as well as examples of systems engineering decisions that, in hindsight, were not optimal. Both 
types of examples are useful for learning. Plans exist for future case studies focusing on various space systems, 
additional aircraft programs, munitions programs, joint Service programs, logistics-led programs, science and 
technology/laboratory efforts, and a variety of commercial systems. 
 
The Department of Defense (DoD) continues to develop and acquire joint complex systems that deliver needed 
capabilities to our warfighters. Systems engineering is the technical and technical management process that focuses 
explicitly on delivering and sustaining robust, high-quality, affordable products. The Air Force leadership has 
collectively stated the need to mature a sound systems engineering process throughout the Air Force. 
 
As we uncovered historical facts and conducted key interviews with program managers and chief engineers, both 
within the Government and those working for the various prime and subcontractors, we concluded that today’s 
systems programs face similar challenges. Applicable systems engineering principles and the effects of 
communication and the environment continue to challenge our ability to provide a balanced technical solution. We 
look forward to your comments on this case study and the others that follow. 
 
 
 
 
John Paschall, Col, USAF 
Deputy Director, Air Force Center for Systems Engineering 
Air Force Institute of Technology 
 
 
 
Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited 
 
The views expressed in this Case Study are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the 
official policy or position of the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the 
United Stated Government. 
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1.   SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PRINCIPLES 
1.1      General Systems Engineering Process 
1.1.1  Introduction 
The Department  of Defense (DoD)  continues to  develop  and  acquire  joint  military service 
weapon systems and deliver the needed capabilities to the warfighter. With a constant objective 
to improve and mature the acquisition process, it continues to pursue new and creative 
methodologies to purchase these technically complex systems. A sound systems engineering 
process, focused explicitly on delivering and sustaining robust, high-quality, affordable products 
that meet the needs of customers and stakeholders must continue to evolve and mature. Systems 
engineering is the technical and technical management process that results in delivered products 
and systems that exhibit the best balance of cost and performance. The process must operate 
effectively from identified gaps in mission-level capabilities to establish system-level 
requirements; allocate these down to the lowest level of the design; and ensure validation and 
verification of performance, meeting cost and schedule constraints. The systems engineering 
process changes as the program progresses from one phase to the next, as do the tools and 
procedures. The process also changes over the decades, maturing, expanding, growing, and 
evolving from the base established during the conduct of past programs. Systems engineering has 
a long history. Examples can be found demonstrating a disciplined application of effective 
engineering and engineering management, as well as poorly applied, but well-defined, processes. 
Throughout the many decades during which systems engineering has emerged as a discipline, 
many practices, processes, heuristics, and tools have been developed, documented, and applied. 
 
Several core life-cycle stages have surfaced as consistently and continually challenging during 
any system program development. First, system development must proceed from a well- 
developed set of requirements. Secondly, regardless of the evolutionary acquisition approach, the 
system requirements must flow down to all subsystems and lower-level components. And, third, 
the system requirements need to be stable and balanced and properly reflect all activities in all 
intended environments. However, system requirements are not unchangeable. As the system 
design proceeds, if a requirement or set of requirements is proving excessively expensive to 
satisfy, the process must rebalance schedule, cost, and performance by changing or modifying 
the requirements or set of requirements. 
 
Systems engineering includes making key system and design trades early in the process to 
establish the system architecture. These architectural artifacts can depict any new system, legacy 
system, modifications thereto, introduction of new technologies, and overall system-level 
behavior and performance. Modeling and simulation are generally employed to organize and 
assess architectural alternatives at this introductory stage. System and subsystem design follows 
the functional architecture. System architectures are modified if the elements are too risky, 
expensive, or time-consuming. Both newer object-oriented analysis and design and classic 
structured analysis using functional decomposition and information flows/data modeling occurs. 
Design proceeds logically using key design reviews, tradeoff analysis, and prototyping to reduce 
any high-risk technology areas. 
 
Important to the efficient decomposition and creation of the functional and physical architectural 
designs are the management of interfaces and integration of subsystems. This is applied to 
subsystems within a system or across large, complex systems of systems. Once a solution is 
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planned, analyzed, designed, and constructed, validation and verification take place to ensure 
satisfaction of requirements. Definition of test criteria, measures of effectiveness (MOEs), and 
measures of performance (MOPs), established as part of the requirements process, takes place 
well before any component/subsystem assembly design and construction occurs. 
 
There are several excellent representations of the systems engineering process presented in the 
literature. These depictions present the current state of the art in the maturity and evolution of the 
systems engineering process. One can find systems engineering process definitions, guides, and 
handbooks from the International Council on Systems Engineering (INCOSE), Electronics 
Industrial  Association  (EIA),  Institute  of  Electrical  and  Electronics  Engineers  (IEEE),  and 
various DoD agencies and organizations. They show the process as it should be applied by 
today’s experienced practitioner. One of these processes, long used by the Defense Acquisition 
University  (DAU),  is  depicted  by  Figure  1.  It  should  be  noted  that  this  model  is  not 
accomplished in a single pass. This iterative and nested process gets repeated to the lowest level 
of definition of the design and its interfaces. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The Systems Engineering Process as presented by the Defense Acquisition University (DAU) 
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1.1.2      Evolving Systems Engineering Process 
The DAU model, like all others, has been documented in the last two decades and expanded and 
developed to reflect a changing environment. Systems are becoming increasingly complex 
internally and more interconnected externally. The process used to develop aircraft and other 
weapons of the past was a process effective at the time. It served the needs of the practitioners 
and resulted in many successful systems in our inventory. However, the cost and schedule 
performance records of the past programs are fraught with examples of some well-managed 
programs and programs with less than stellar execution. As the nation entered the 1980s and 
1990s, large DoD and commercial acquisitions were overrunning costs and running behind 
schedule. The aerospace industry and its organizations were becoming larger and more 
geographically and culturally distributed. The systems engineering process, as applied within the 
confines of a single system or single company, was no longer the norm. 
 
Today, many factors overshadow new acquisitions, including system-of-systems (SoS) context, 
network-centric warfare and operations, and rapid growth in information technology (IT). In the 
context of SoS, a group of independently operated systems are interdependently related within 
and across all lanes of the interoperability to effectively support an overarching objective. These 
factors have driven a new form of emergent systems engineering, which focuses on certain 
aspects of our current process. One of these increased areas of focus resides in the architectural 
definitions used during system analysis. This process is differentiated by greater reliance on 
reusable  architectural  views  describing  the  system  context  and  Concept  of  Operations 
(CONOPS), interoperability, information and data flows, and network service-oriented 
characteristics. The DoD has recently made these architectural products, described in the DoD 
Architectural Framework (DoDAF), mandatory to enforce this new architecture-driven, systems 
engineering process throughout the acquisition life-cycle. 
 
1.1.3      Case Studies 
The systems engineering  process to  be used  in  today’s complex SoS  projects  is a process 
matured and  founded on the principles of systems developed  in the past. The examples of 
systems engineering used in other programs, both past and present, provide a wealth of lessons to 
be used in applying and understanding today’s process. 
 
The purpose of developing detailed case studies is to support the teaching of systems engineering 
principles. Case studies facilitate learning by emphasizing to the student the long-term 
consequences of the systems engineering and programmatic decisions on program success. The 
systems engineering case studies assist in discussion of both successful and unsuccessful 
methodologies, processes, principles, tools, and decision material to assess the outcome of 
alternatives at the program/system level. In addition, the importance of using skills from multiple 
professions  and  engineering  disciplines  and  collecting,  assessing,  and  integrating  varied 
functional data is emphasized. Analysis of these aspects will provide the student with real-world, 
detailed examples of how the process plays a significant role in balancing cost, schedule, and 
performance. 
 
The utilization and misutilization of systems engineering principles are highlighted with special 
emphasis on the conditions that foster and impede good systems engineering practices. Case 
studies should be used to illustrate both good and bad examples of acquisition management and 
learning principles, including determining if: 
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•  Every system provides a balanced and optimized product to a customer 
 
•  Effective requirements analysis was applied 
 
• Consistent  and  rigorous  application  of  systems  engineering  management  standards  was 
applied 
 
•  Effective test planning was accomplished 
 
•  Effective major technical program reviews were conducted 
 
•  Continuous risk assessments and management was implemented 
 
•  Reliable cost estimates and policies were developed 
 
•  Disciplined application of configuration management was demonstrated 
 
•  A system boundary was well defined 
 
•  Disciplined methodologies were developed for complex systems 
 
• Problem-solving  methods  incorporated  understanding  of  the  system  within  a  bigger 
environment (customer’s customer) 
 
The systems engineering process translates an operational need into a set of system elements. 
These system elements are allocated and translated by the systems engineering process into 
detailed requirements. The systems engineering process, from the identification of the need to 
the development and utilization of the product, must continuously integrate and optimize system 
and  subsystem performance  within  cost  and  schedule  to  provide  an  operationally  effective 
system throughout  its  life-cycle.  Case  studies  highlight  the  various  interfaces  and 
communications to achieve this optimization, which include: 
 
• The  program  manager/systems  engineering  interface,  which  is  essential  between  the 
operational user and developer (acquirer) to translate the needs into the performance 
requirements for the system and subsystems 
 
• The Government/contractor interface, essential for the practice of systems engineering to 
translate and allocate the performance requirements into detailed requirements 
 
• The  developer  (acquirer)/user  interface  within  the  project,  essential  for  the  systems 
engineering practice of integration and balance 
 
The systems engineering process must manage risk, known and unknown, as well as internal and 
external. This objective specifically focuses on external factors and the impact of uncontrollable 
influences, such as actions of Congress, changes in funding, new instructions/policies, changing 
stakeholders or user requirements, or contractor and Government staffing levels. 
 
Lastly, the systems engineering process must respond to mega-trends in the systems engineering 
discipline itself, as the nature of systems engineering and related practices vary with time. 
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1.1.4      Framework for Analysis 
This case study is presented in a format that follows the learning principles specifically derived 
for the program, using the Friedman-Sage Framework to organize the assessment of the 
application of the systems engineering process. The framework and derived matrix can play an 
important role in developing case studies in systems engineering and systems management, 
especially case studies that involve systems acquisition. The framework presents a nine-row by 
three-column matrix shown in Figure 2. 
 
Concept Domain Responsibility Domain 
 1. Contractor 
Responsibility 
2. Shared 
Responsibility 
3. Government 
Responsibility 
A. Requirements Definition and Management    
B. Systems Architecting and Conceptual 
Design 
   
C. System and Subsystem Detailed Design 
and Implementation 
   
D. Systems and Interface Integration    
E. Validation and Verification    
F. Deployment and Post Deployment    
G. Life-Cycle Support    
H. Risk Assessment and management    
I. System and Program management    
 
Figure 2. Framework of Key Systems Engineering Concepts and Responsibilities 
 
Six of the nine concept domain areas in Figure 2 represent phases in the systems engineering 
life-cycle: 
 
Requirements Definition and Management 
 
Systems Architecting and Conceptual Design 
 
Detailed System and Subsystem Design and Implementation 
 
Systems and Interface Integration 
 
Validation and Verification 
 
System Deployment and Post-Deployment 
 
Three of the concept areas represent necessary process and systems management support: 
Life-cycle Support 
Risk Management 
 
System and Program Management 
 
While other concepts could have been identified, the Friedman-Sage Framework suggests that 
these nine are the most relevant to systems engineering in that they cover the essential life-cycle 
processes in systems acquisition and systems management support in the conduct of the process. 
Most other concept areas identified during the development of the matrix appear to be subsets of 
one of these areas. The three columns of this two-dimensional framework represent the 
responsibilities and perspectives of the Government and contractor and shared responsibilities 
between the Government and contractor. 
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The Friedman-Sage Matrix is not a unique systems engineering applications tool, but rather a 
disciplined  approach  to  evaluate the  systems  engineering  process,  tools,  and  procedures  as 
applied to a program. The Friedman-Sage Matrix is based on two major premises as the founding 
objectives: 
 
1.  In teaching systems engineering, case studies can be instructive in that they relate aspects 
of the real world to the student to provide valuable program experience and professional 
practice to academic theory 
2.   In teaching  systems engineering  in  DoD, there has previously  been  little distinction 
between duties and responsibilities of the Government and industry activities. More often 
than not, the Government role in systems engineering is the role of the requirements 
developer 
 
1.2      T-6A Texan II Major Learning Principles and Friedman-Sage Matrix 
The authors’ selection of learning principles and the Friedman-Sage Matrix are reflected in the 
Executive Summary of this case (separate attachment). 
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2.   T-6A Texan II Description 
2.1      Background 
The history of the T-6 dates back to the pre-World War II days. 
When one “googles” the T-6, numerous “hits” appear on the T-6 
Texan designed by North American Aviation in the early 1930s. 
The T-6 was a single engine trainer used by the Army, Navy, and 
Royal Air Force to train their forces during World War II. Over 
15,000 aircraft were built. The Army designated the original T-6 
Texan as the AT-6, the Navy as the SNJ, and the Royal Air Force 
as the Harvard.                                                                                             AT-6 /SNJ/Harvard1 
 
The current version of the T-6 is designated the T-6 Texan II to distinguish it from its 
predecessor, the T-6 Texan. The T-6 Texan II is a derivative of a commercial aircraft, the PC-9, 
manufactured by Pilatus Aircraft, a company located in Switzerland. In addition to the United 
States Air Force, the primary users of the PC-9 are the Swiss Air 
Force, Royal Australian Air Force, Royal Saudi Air Force, Royal 
Thai Air Force, and Irish Air Corps. First flight of the PC-9 
prototype occurred on May 7, 1984, with certification being 
obtained in September 1985. Beech Aircraft and Pilatus teamed to 
develop the Beech Mark II with a larger cockpit, stepped ejection 
seats, and a ventral brake. The Beech Mark II ultimately won the 
competition and became designated the T-6 Texan II.                                     Pilatus PC-92 
 
2.2      T-6A Texan II 
The T-6 Texan II is a two-seat, single-engine aircraft whose purpose is to train Air Force and 
Navy pilots in basic flying skills. The T-6 replaces the T-37B for the Air Force and T-34C for 
the Navy. The aircraft is produced by Hawker Beechcraft, formerly Raytheon Aircraft Company 
(RAC). The aircraft is a derivative of the Pilatus PC-9 with numerous design changes necessary 
to meet the Air Force and Navy requirements. The aircraft cockpit 
is designed with stepped, tandem seating (one crewmember in front 
of the other) with the rear seat raised slightly to improve visibility. 
The instructor typically sits in the rear seat, but the student and 
instructor positions are interchangeable, and a single pilot may fly 
the aircraft alone from the front seat. The cockpit is also designed to 
accommodate a minimum of 80 percent of the eligible female pilot 
population.                                                                                                         T-6A Texan II3 
 
An egress system is provided, which allows for zero altitude/zero speed ejection through the 
canopy. The canopy is single opening, non-jettison, and capable of surviving a four-pound bird 
strike up to 270 knots true air speed (KTAS). The cockpit is pressurized and has an Onboard 
Oxygen Generating System, which, together, permits training at higher, less congested altitudes. 
Figure 3 depicts the cockpit layout. 
 
 
 
1 T-6 Texan, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/T-6_Texan, 28 May 2009 
2 Pilatus PC-9, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pilatus_PC-9, 28 May 2009 
3 T-6A Texan II, http://www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet_media.asp?fsID=124, 28 May 2009 
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Front Instrument Panel Rear Instrument Panel 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Cockpit Configuration 
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The  T-6  Texan  II  has  a  Pratt  &  Whitney  Canada  PT6A-68  turbo-prop  engine  with  1830 
equivalent  thermodynamic  shaft  horsepower,  flat  rated  to  1100  shaft  horsepower,  and  is 
equipped with a four-blade propeller. The aircraft can climb at a rate of 3,100 feet per minute, 
reaching 18,000 feet in less than six minutes. 
 
A 3,000 psi hydraulic system powers the flaps, speedbrake, and landing gear. 
 
The aircraft is fully aerobatic and has an advanced avionics suite that includes an Angle of 
Attack System; Electronic Attitude Director Indicator; Electronic Horizontal Situation Indicator; 
UHF communications; Integrated Landing System; and Airborne Traffic Collision Warning 
System. The instrumentation package is Instrument Flight Rule Certified. 
 
In reality, the T-6A configuration represents a significant modification to the baseline Pilatus 
PC-9. Figure 4 depicts some of the more significant changes. Figure 5 lists the aircraft’s general 
characteristics. 
 
• New aft fuselage for better handling qualities 
 
• Redesigned wing for durability and damage tolerance 
 
• New canopy shape for pressurization 
 
• New cowling for reduced maintenance time 
 
• Enhanced engine (PT-6A-68 ilo PT-6A-62) 
 
o Increased horsepower for excellent aerobatics 
 
o Digital engine control for jet-like performance 
 
o Continuous initial separator for foreign object damage (FOD) protection 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Differences between T-6A and PC-94 
 
 
 
 
4 Dispelling the Myth: The T-6 Is Not a PC-9, www.hawkerbeechcraft.com/military/t-6a/not_pc_9.pdf, 3 June 2009, 
Page 1 
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Air Force Designation: T-6 
Navy Designation: T-6 
Primary Function: Entry level trainer 
Builder: Hawker Beechcraft Corporation (formerly Raytheon) 
Wingspan: 33.5 feet 
Length: 33.4 feet 
Height: 10.7 feet 
Speed: 320 miles per hour 
Standard Basic Empty Weight: 4,707 pounds 
Maximum Takeoff Weight: 6,500 pounds 
Ceiling: 31,000 feet 
Range: 900 nautical miles 
Crew: Two; student pilot and instructor pilot 
Seating: Stepped, tandem seating with one crewmember in front of the other 
Powerplant: Single 1,100 horsepower Pratt & Whitney Canada PT6A-68 turbo-prop engine 
Flight Controls: Dual-forward and aft 
Landing Gear: Tricycle, retractable 
Armament: None 
Date Deployed: May 2000 
 
 
Figure 5. General Characteristics 
 
2.3      Joint Primary Aircraft Training System (JPATS) 
The focus of this case study is limited to the T-6 aircraft. However, one must note that the T-6 is 
but one element of the total training system dubbed JPATS. JPATS consists of the T-6 aircraft, 
Ground Based Training System (GBTS), and Contractor Operated and Maintained Base Supply 
(COMBS) System. Hawker Beechcraft is the prime contractor for all three elements. 
 
The GBTS consists of the following four segments: 
 
• Aircrew Training Devices 
 
• Development Courses 
 
• Conversion Courses 
 
• Operational Support 
 
The Aircrew Training Devices consist of five non-motion simulators that include the Operational 
Flight Trainer, an Instrumental Flight Trainer, a Unit Training Device, an Escape System Trainer, 
and an Egress Procedures Trainer. 
 
The  Development  Courses include  the Principal  Courses,  Naval Flight  Officer  Courses,  and 
Administrative Courses. 
 
The Conversion Courses consist of two elements: a) the Computer Aided Instruction to New 
Computer Based Training System, which are the courses that must be converted from their existing 
media to the new JPATS media and b) the Training Integration Management System (TIMS), 
which is a networked computer-based system that manages and tracks student training. It 
encompasses the resource scheduling, performance evaluation, and deficiency tracking for each 
T-6A Texan II Engineering Case Study 
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trainee. 
 
COMBS is the contractor-operated and maintained logistics support system for supporting all 
phases of operations without exceeding the Not Mission Capable Supply rate specified in the 
aircraft Prime Item Product Function Specification (PIPFS). 
 
Figure 6 is a depiction of the integrated training system. 
 
 
Figure 6. JPATS5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 Joint Primary Aircrew Training System (JPATS) History, Hawker Beechcraft, 21 May 2009, Chart 2 
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2.4      History of Hawker Beechcraft 
 
Hawker Beechcraft  had  its origin  in 1932 when Walter H. and 
Olive Ann Beech founded the Beech Aircraft Corporation. Their 
first aircraft was the Beechcraft Model 17 “Staggerwing,” designed 
for the business traveler. The aircraft proved to be faster than the 
military pursuit airplanes of the day, and it won numerous air races. 
In 1937, Beech introduced its second aircraft, the Model 18 “Twin 
Beech,” which, amazingly, remained in production until 1970. 
During World War II, Beech produced 7,400 airplanes for the 
United States and  Allied armed  forces. “It  is estimated that  90 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Staggerwing 
percent of all U.S. Army Air Corps bombardiers and navigators are trained in AT-7 and AT-11 
aircraft  –  derivatives  of  the  Beechcraft  Model  18.”6 During  the  1960s  and  1970s,  Beech 
established itself as a leader in the business jet arena, producing aircraft, such as the Baron B55, 
Baron G58, Model 90 Beech King Air, Beechcraft 99 Airliner, and Beech King Air 200. 
 
On February 8, 1980, Beech Aircraft Corporation became a subsidiary of Raytheon Company, an 
electronics and technology company located in Lexington, Massachusetts. Following the 
acquisition, Beech continued to develop new models, such as the Beech King Air 300, Beechjet 
400, Beech King Air 350, and T-1A. In August 1993, the Raytheon Company acquired Raytheon 
Corporate Jets from British Aerospace, a company that produced the mid-sized Hawker jet line. 
A  year  later  (September  1994),  during  the  JPATS  Source  Selection,  Beech  Aircraft  and 
Raytheon Corporate Jets merged to become Raytheon Aircraft. Following the merger, Raytheon 
Aircraft developed aircraft, such as the Raytheon Premier I, Hawker 800 XP, Hawker 900 XP, 
Hawker 750, and T-6. 
 
On March 26, 2007, the Raytheon Company sold Raytheon Aircraft “in order to focus on its 
military  contracting  business.”7 Goldman  Sachs  Group  and  Onex  Corporation  bought  the 
company for about $3.3 billion and changed the company’s name to Hawker Beechcraft. The 
new company continues, benefiting from the rich history associated with the two former 
companies. 
 
3.   T-6A Texan II Program 
3.1      History 
3.1.1      Trainer “State of the Union” 
In the 1980s, the Air Force and Congress realized that the current Air Force training resources, 
the T-37 and T-38, were rapidly approaching obsolescence. This was mainly because of the age 
of the T-37 and T-38 and the rapidly evolving performance, advanced avionics, and cockpit 
displays  of  the  new  generation  aircraft.  Fairchild-Republic  Corporation  won  a  contract  to 
develop the T-46 Eaglet trainer aircraft, and the Air Force planned to buy 650 of these aircraft to 
replace the aging T-37. First flight occurred in 1985, but the program was cancelled because of 
budget cuts required to comply with the Gramm-Rudman Act. With the loss of the T-46, the Air 
 
 
6 About Us – History, Hawker Beechcraft, http://hawkerbeechcraft.com/about_us/history, 28 May 2009, Page 1 
7 Hawker Beechcraft Corporation, Hoover’s, http://www.hoovers.com/hawker-beechcraft/--ID_103890 
profile.xhtml, 18 June 2009 
/free-co- 
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Cessna T-378 Northrop T-389 
 
Training Command (ATC) began drafting a Trainer Master Plan to identify a preferred training 
path, as well as the types and numbers of training aircraft required to achieve this training. They 
also felt the need to use commercial aircraft and training devices as much as possible to reduce 
development time and costs based on their T-46 experience. 
 
3.1.1.1     Air Force Trainer Master Plan 
 
The Air Force Trainer Master Plan was published in April 1988. The training path it identified 
was to move from the current generalized (i.e., primary) training to Specialized Undergraduate 
Pilot Training. Specialized training would be tailored to fighter-bomber and transport-tanker 
pilots to ease the transition into these advanced aircraft. ATC required three new training aircraft 
to achieve this objective: a subsonic, entry level (i.e., primary) trainer to serve as a replacement 
for the T-37; a supersonic, fighter-bomber type of trainer to serve as a replacement for the T-38; 
and a new airlift and tanker trainer.10 
 
ATC’s initial step was to pursue the new Tanker-Transport Training System (TTTS), which 
became the T-1A system and included 211 modified business jets, training devices, and other 
equipment. The second step would be the acquisition of a Primary Aircraft Training System 
(PATS) to replace the T-37. In light of the T-46 experience, ATC decided to follow the same 
acquisition strategy as the TTTS and pursue a commercially available aircraft for expediency and 
cost effectiveness. The expected PATS fleet size was 538 aircraft. Initially, all of the companies 
interested in competing were foreign but were seeking to partner with United States companies, 
since it was perceived that the United States Government would not be inclined to buy a foreign 
manufactured aircraft. The Request for Proposals (RFP) was to be released in February 1994 
with contract award in October 1994. Delivery of the first aircraft was projected to be in 1995 
with Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in 1999 and Full Operational Capability (FOC) in 
2004.11 
 
The third and final step was to develop the Bomber-Fighter Training System (BFTS) as the 
replacement for the T-38. Since this would likely be a development program, ATC planned to 
complete pre-concept studies and perform a program analysis before beginning the competition. 
 
 
 
8 Cessna T-37, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:T-37_021203-O-9999G-003.jpg, 18 June 2009 
9 Northrop T-38, http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/50/Northrop_T-38A_Talon_USAF.jpg, 18 June 
2009 
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3.1.2      Defense Authorization Act 
 
Following a review of the Air Force Trainer Master Plan, Congress directed the DoD, through 
the Defense Modernization Act for Fiscal Year (FY)89, to submit a report containing their future 
plans for both Air Force and Navy training. The House and Senate Armed Services Committees 
wanted a combined DoD plan that would allow the Navy and Air Force to procure similar 
training  aircraft  to  minimize costs. The Air  Force was directed  to  take the lead  by Under 
Secretary of Defense (USD) Costello and develop the report for Congress. 
 
The DoD Trainer Master Plan was developed and contained one major difference from the Air 
Force Trainer Master Plan; this concerned the costs to extend the T-37’s useful life. The Air 
Force had contracted Cessna to perform a Durability and Damage Tolerance Analysis (DADTA) 
of the T-37. The results of this analysis identified new Structural Life Extension Program12 
(SLEP) procedures that could save $85 million over the previously defined SLEP procedures. 
The original SLEP indicated the need to replace six fatigue critical structural components at a 
high cost. Following the DADTA, only two components were judged to  require immediate 
replacement, and three others could be replaced, as needed. A two-phase inspection, field level 
and depot level, was required to accomplish this update.13 Even with the change in T-37 life 
extension costs, the DoD Trainer Master Plan indicated the need for a new PATS. 
 
The DoD Trainer Master Plan still laid out the plan to procure a PATS in increased numbers to 
accommodate Navy requirements and phase out the T-37. But contrary to the DoD Trainer 
Master Plan, Congress authorized $14 million to begin a T-37 life extension program instead of 
procuring a PATS. They also suggested that the Air Force consider the Navy’s T-45 as a 
replacement for the T-38. This would allow joint development of a PATS aircraft to replace both 
the T-37 and T-34. Replacing the T-38 with the T-45 was a no-win situation in the Air Force’s 
opinion. Although costs would be lower, since the T-45 was already in production, it would 
mean slipping the PATS T-37/T-34 replacement. Likewise, the T-45 would not be economical 
from the Air Force perspective. The T-45 aircraft carrier requirements included a heavier nose 
gear for catapult launches and structurally beefed up main landing gear and wing structure for 
carrier landings, which added unneeded weight for Air Force training operations. The Air Force 
would  bear the cost  of either decreased  fuel efficiency because of the extra weight  or the 
increased procurement costs for the removal of Navy specific design requirements.14 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12 Also know as Service Life Extension Program 
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Beechcraft T-3415 T-45 Goshawk16 
 
There were also other issues with buying T-45s and delaying PATS. The T-45 was not advanced 
enough to fulfill the Air Force requirement to prepare pilots to fly aircraft with the technological 
advances expected in the 21st century. This would also require yet another T-37 SLEP and miss 
the opportunity to procure a JPATS. 
 
The Navy and Air Force signed a training Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on December 
6, 1988. The MOU stated that both Services would cooperate in identifying the need and 
requirements for three training systems, one to fulfill the Air Force tanker-transport and Naval 
flight officer training requirements, one to serve as a JPATS aircraft, and one to meet Air Force 
fighter-bomber and Navy strike training system requirements. 
 
DoD  trusted  that  these  arguments,  along  with  the  DoD  Trainer  Master  Plan,  would  show 
Congress that reversing the T-37 and T-38 acquisition strategy was not in the best interest of the 
Navy or Air Force.17 
 
3.1.2.1     Validated Primary Aircraft Training System (PATS) Statement of Need 
(SON) 
 
ATC began gathering the information necessary to  fulfill the direction of the DoD Trainer 
Master Plan. In June 1988, they sent a draft SON for primary aircraft training to the Major 
Commands (MAJCOMs)  for comment. They also  sent  a fact-finding team, not the first, to 
Europe to evaluate and explore the technologies of six candidate aircraft and reinforce their 
commitment to the PATS program. This team consisted of Maj Gen Robert Delligatti (ATC Vice 
Commander); Capt LynnAnne Merten (ATC PATS Acquisition Manager); and Capt Patrick 
Nolan (the General’s Executive Officer). The candidate aircraft included the British Aerospace 
Hawk; Gruppo Agusta S-211 from Italy; Pilatus PC-9 from Switzerland; Aermacchi MB 339 
from Italy; CASA C-10 from Spain; and Proavia Jet Squalus from Belgium. The team was 
unable to fully evaluate the Squalus because of bad weather. The team was also able to evaluate 
the IA-63 Pampa from Argentina when the Argentine Air Force flew the aircraft to Randolph Air 
 
 
 
 
 
15 Beechcraft T-34, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:T-34C-1.jpg, 18 June 2009 
16 T-45 Goshawk, http://www.patricksaviation.com/uploads/photos/23165.jpg, 18 June 2009 
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Force Base (AFB), Texas. The SON was then updated and validated by the ATC Commander, 
Gen Oakes, in December 1988 and sent to Headquarters (HQ) Air Force for review.18 
 
3.1.2.2     JPATS SON 
 
In late 1988, ATC requested that the Aeronautical Systems Division release a contract for a 
PATS pre-concept study. This study was to develop a total training approach by integrating 
primary training with BFTS and TTTS training. The contract was awarded to the Illinois Institute 
of Technology Research Institute (IITRI). The three objectives of the study were to (1) identify 
the flying skills the student needed to acquire in primary training and the tasks the student must 
perform to  acquire them; (2)  identify the total training  system (flight  hours, ground hours, 
training devices, etc.); and (3) identify the benefits and life-cycle costs of training in a turboprop, 
twin engine jet, single engine jet, and single engine jet with more thrust. The Navy pursued a 
similar study as the Air  Force. The results of both studies would then be used to  identify 
common requirements leading to a JPATS acquisition. 19 
 
ATC issued the PATS SON on January 11, 1989, to begin the acquisition process. This was to 
become the JPATS, which would include commercially available off-the-shelf simulators, 
courseware, and a training management system. 
 
As the prospect of a joint primary trainer was coming closer to reality, the Navy and Air Force 
began attending each other’s training conferences and visiting their training bases. This allowed 
them to understand the training philosophies and, in the Navy’s case, airfield flight restrictions. 
An O-6 working group, along with a JPATS committee of Action Officers, was formed to 
develop a draft Joint System Operational Requirements Document (JSORD). A tandem seating 
configuration was selected over side-by-side, as it would provide a 
wider field of view, lower drag, and be more representative of high- 
performance cockpits. This was a huge paradigm shift for the Air 
Force, since it had been using the side-by-side cockpit configuration 
of the T-37 for 30 years. The type of power plant required (turbo jet, 
turboprop, or turbo fan) and the number of engines was left open. 
The members decided that performance and handling characteristics 
should have the greatest importance.20 
T-3721 
 
In September 1989, ATC again sent a team to Europe to evaluate commercially available JPATS 
candidates (Figure 7). They evaluated five tandem seating aircraft, a ducted fan aircraft from 
Germany, the PC-9 turboprop from Switzerland, the MB-339 and S-211 from Italy, and the 
Tucano from Ireland. Another team went to Europe to evaluate the logistics aspects of the 
candidate aircraft, as well as the third flight evaluation team within the past three years. The 
information gathered during these fact-finding trips put ATC in a better position to determine 
achievable operational requirements. ATC also held an Industry Day in April 1989, which 24 
 
 
 
 
 
18 Ibid, Page 6 
19 Ibid, Page 8 
20 Ibid, Page 9 
21 T-37 Cockpit, http://www.airbum.com/pireps/PirepCessnaT-37.html, 1 July 2009 
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contractors attended. This gave the contractors insight  into ATC’s training and maintenance 
operations and restrictions.22 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
British Aerospace Hawk23 Pilatus PC-924 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Aermacchi MB 33925 Proavia Jet Squalus26 IA-63 Pampa27 
 
 
 
Fantrainer 60028 Shorts Tucano29 
Figure 7. Candidate PATS/JPATS Aircraft 
 
 
 
 
22 Ibid, Page 12 
23 British Aerospace Hawk, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Bae_hawk_t1_xx245_inflight_arp.jpg, 1 July 2009 
24 Pilatus PC-9, http://www.pilatus-aircraft.com/html/en/products/, 1 July 2009 
25 Aermacchi MB 339, http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/7/76/MB-339CD.jpg, 1 July 2009 
26 Proavia Jet Squalus, http://www.hi-litesbyhigh.com/OtherCountriesAircraft/Belgium/BelgiumAircraft.html, 1 July 
2009 
27 IA-63 Pampa, http://www.aircraftinformation.info/Images/at-63_01.jpg, 1 July 2009 
28 Fantrainer 600, http://www.airliners.net/photo/Unknown/RFB-Fantrainer-600/0372958/L/, 1 July 2009 
29 Shorts Tucano (under license to Embraer), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Short_tucano_t1_zf210_flying_ 
arp.jpg, 1 July 2009 
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3.1.2.3     JPATS Program Management Directive (PMD) 
 
A new PMD for specialized undergraduate pilot training was released by HQ Air Force in July 
1990, which stressed joint Air Force/Navy procurement of a JPATS. As the means to achieve 
this, it directed the development of two documents, the Joint Statement of Operational Need 
(JSON) and JSORD.30 
 
3.1.2.4     Concept Studies 
 
In June 1989, IITRI was well into the PATS study begun under contract to the Aeronautical 
Systems Division. As the concept of a joint acquisition evolved, the Navy decided to have a 
similar study performed. The contract to IITRI was extended to perform a Navy study to identify 
a concept for replacing the T-34C and determining the feasibility of using common aircraft and 
training system components. The Air Force PATS study was completed in July 1990. The study 
divided the candidate aircraft into groups according to type of engine (turboprop or jet), number 
of engines, and thrust/power. The results were that costs, complexity, and maintenance 
requirements were directly related to aircraft performance. 
The study also identified issues with the current T-37 primary training program. It recommended 
increased instruction in instrument flying, formation flying, and visual flight rules flying. It 
recommended more than doubling the ground training hours and noted that the drivers in the life- 
cycle costs were the operation and maintenance of the aircraft. The ground-based training costs 
contributed  little  to  the  overall  costs.  Increases  in  ground-based  training  could  improve 
effectiveness with little impact to life-cycle costs.31 
HQ Air Force released the PMD for Specialized Undergraduate Pilot Training in February 1991. 
This directed the procurement of the T-1A Training System and directed that the necessary 
actions be taken to procure an enhanced flight screening aircraft. This included replacement of 
the T-37 with a JPATS and the development of a JSORD with the Navy. 32 
 
3.1.2.5     Joint Statement of Operational Need (JSON) 
 
Development of the JSON was well underway within the Navy. The Air Force had already 
developed a PATS SON, and the Navy developed a similar document, the Tentative Operational 
Requirements (TOR), for the Navy training system. The two documents were merged, and the 
JSON was released on September 14, 1990. The JSON’s preferred acquisition strategy was to 
buy a missionized commercially available training aircraft and ground-based training systems 
common to both Services. The JSON also stated that some portions of the training systems could 
be tailored for Service-unique requirements.33 
 
3.1.3     Trainer Aircraft Summit 
 
When the Air Force and Navy concept studies were complete and the results were analyzed, it 
became obvious that acquisition of a joint primary training aircraft made good sense. The type of 
flying skills that needed to be acquired and the tasks that needed to be performed to achieve 
those skills were remarkably similar between the Services. A trainer aircraft summit was held at 
 
 
30 A Training System for the 21st Century: JPATS and the T-6, Richard H Emmons, June 2004, Page 13 
31 Ibid, Page 14 
32 Ibid, Page 14 
33 Ibid, Page 15 
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Randolph AFB in October 1991. Participants included all interested acquisition and training 
organizations, as well as the Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF) and Chief of Naval 
Operations (CNO). Both the Navy and Air Force laid out training plans that funneled the pilots 
from the primary training program to various specialized undergraduate pilot programs. 34 
 
3.1.3.1     Draft Joint System Operational Requirements Document (JSORD) 
 
In preparing the student pilots for specialized training, the JPATS aircraft had to meet certain 
minimum requirements: 
 
1.   Operate from sea level to 22,000 feet 
 
2.   Maintain 250 knot speed with a 270 knot dash requirement 
 
3.   Withstand G loads of +6 to -3 
 
4.   Take off and land with 25 knot crosswinds 
 
5.   Operate with handling characteristics forgiving of student pilot errors 
 
6.   Eject safely at sea level and 60 knots 
 
7.   Accommodate students with a seating height of 34 to 40 inches 
 
8.   Operate on 5,000-foot runways 
 
Tandem seating was a previously agreed to configuration, but the number and type of power 
plants remained unspecified. 
 
At the end of the trainer summit, both the CSAF and CNO agreed with joint planning and 
approved release of the JSORD, which occurred on October 22, 1991.35 
 
3.1.3.2     Solicitation for Information 
 
Before the Trainer Summit, a solicitation for information was released by the System Program 
Office (SPO), inquiring about industry interest in competing for JPATS. More than 12 firms 
from Europe and Latin America with trainers already flying expressed interest in competing. 
Knowing of the United States dislike for buying foreign, most of these companies partnered with 
major United States aerospace firms. 36 
 
3.1.3.3     Operational Requirements Document (ORD) Revised 
 
The Air Force and Navy plan was to update the JPATS ORD periodically up to the release of the 
RFP as new requirements were developed or refined. A new version was released in April 1992, 
approved by the CSAF and CNO, and released to perspective JPATS competitors. The major 
change in the ORD was the reduction of Air Force aircraft because of an estimated reduction in 
navigator  and  pilot  slots.37 It  should  be  noted  that,  during  this  time,  there  was  a  major 
realignment of the Air Force MAJCOMs. The Tactical Air Command (TAC) and most of the 
Strategic Air Command (SAC) were merged into the new Air Combat Command (ACC). The 
 
 
 
 
34 Ibid, Page 16 
35 Ibid, Page 16 
36 Ibid, Page 17 
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Military Airlift Command (MAC) was transformed into the Air Mobility Command (AMC), 
which included some SAC assets.38 
 
3.1.3.4     Revised Department of Defense (DoD) Trainer Master Plan 
 
The Navy had become much more involved since the original Trainer Master Plan was released, 
and this resulted in a new version of the plan in 1992. The new plan also included a helicopter 
specialized training plan for the Air Force. Previously, Air Force helicopter pilot trainees did not 
get fixed wing experience before attending helicopter flight school at Fort Rucker, Alabama. 
This now meant that all Air Force pilots would complete primary training together and receive 
their specialty aircraft training preferences based on class standing and slots available. This also 
brought the Air Force and Navy specialized training tracks even more in line. 
 
3.2      JPATS Acquisition 
 
The history of the JPATS acquisition illustrates the programmatic impacts of continual change 
and subsequent program redirection. During this process, many of the DoD senior leaders were 
changing. A new administration was installed, and Acquisition Reform became the new buzz 
word. The Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) was enacted in 1994. The DoD 5000 
series was being changed to accommodate Acquisition Reform. The DoD created a new position 
just to manage the change, Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition Reform 
(DUSD[AR]), which reported to the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF). Some of the key 
Acquisition Reform events are presented in Figure 8. 
 
February 1991 DoDD 5000.1 DoDI 5000.2 changed and reissued and 5000.2M 
promulgated 
June 1993 Colleen Preston assumes the position as DUSD(AR) 
October 1993 FASA of 1994 enacted 
February 1994 William J. Perry replaces Les Aspin as Secretary of Defense 
October 1994 Paul Kaminski is sworn in as USD for Acquisition and Technology 
(A&T) 
December 1994 The Defense Acquisition Pilot Program (DAPP) is launched as 
allowed by FASA 
Figure 8. Key Acquisition Reform Events 
 
3.2.1     Acquisition Strategy 
The Air Force was in the process of acquiring the T-1A to fulfill their tanker-transport training 
requirement, a very slightly modified commercial aircraft. It remained on schedule mainly 
because of the non-developmental nature of the program. The Navy, on the other hand, was 
having schedule issues with the T-45 Goshawk. It was based on a British aircraft already in 
service overseas, but developmental issues with the Navy specific requirement of carrier 
operations were causing acquisition schedule delays. Through these acquisition experiences and 
courseware development issues, both Services realized the need to have more Government 
interaction during the development phase of the courseware. Based on the T-1A and T-45 
acquisitions and the Trainer Master Plan, the Air Force and Navy concluded that they could use 
common off-the-shelf GBTS hardware. They decided that a fixed price contract would be used 
for the ground-based hardware, but a cost plus contract would be best for the courseware because 
of the need for extensive Government involvement. 
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Core to the acquisition strategy was the utilization of commercial items, practices, and processes 
to the maximum extent possible in order to reduce acquisition cost. The aircraft was to be largely 
non-developmental with only limited missionization required to fulfill the needs of the using 
Services. Thus, the JPATS would be based on the existing production aircraft and commercial 
components, such as avionics and engines. 39 ATC’s preferred acquisition strategy was to use one 
contractual vehicle for both the airframe and GBTS. This would give them a single point of 
contact (POC) when issues arose in any part of the training system. 
 
3.2.2     Initial Partnering 
 
After the single contract acquisition strategy was developed, the airframe manufacturers looked 
for simulator and ground-based training partners. Beech/Pilatus added British Aerospace to the 
team, and Grumman/Agusta added Hughes to their team. Vought/Fabrica Militair De Avionics 
teamed with Loral; Lockheed/Aermacchi teamed with AAI; Northrop/Embraer teamed with 
Quintron; and Rockwell/Deutsche Aerospace MBB teamed with CAE Link. 40 
 
3.2.3     Operational Demonstrations 
 
One  of the  actions  from  the  Trainer  Summit  in  1991  was  for  the  JPATS  SPO  to  set  up 
operational demonstrations for the candidate aircraft at Wright-Patterson AFB (WPAFB), Ohio. 
The 4950th  Test Wing (TW) would run the demonstrations with the participation of Navy and 
ATC pilots. This would give the Government an opportunity to evaluate the various candidates 
before release of the draft RFPs. This also gave the contractors a chance to market their hardware 
and capabilities. Two candidates completed the demonstrations when they were halted by the 
USD(A&T), Mr. Donald Yockey, because of cost concerns. 
 
3.2.4     Definition of Non-Developmental 
 
The  USD(A&T)  was  concerned  that  the  operational  demonstrations  were  using  too  much 
research and development funds. He and his staff were also questioning the definition of “non- 
developmental,” as well as the single contract acquisition strategy. Some of the candidate aircraft 
were strictly off-the-shelf, but other candidates were making major design changes. How much 
change can be made and still be considered non-developmental was and still is open to 
interpretation. Any proposed candidate aircraft still had to be developed to United States or 
foreign commercial or military standards and had to have an aerobatic civil certificate or the 
military equivalent. The result of these questions was a pause in the program, a change in 
acquisition strategy, and a resulting schedule slip. 
 
3.2.5     Change in Acquisition Strategy 
 
The acquisition strategy shifted from a single airframe/GBTS contract to separate airframe and 
GBTS contracts. Teaming arrangements had already been made to accommodate the single 
contract concept, and proprietary information was flowing among the teams. 
 
The new acquisition plan was for the Air Force to first select the airframe manufacturer. 
Following that selection, a GBTS source selection would be held. One benefit to this approach is 
that JPATS would get both the best airframe and best GBTS. 
 
 
39 “A Case Study: Acquisition Reform and the Joint Primary Training Aircraft System (JPATS),” Kenneth W. 
McKinley, 18 June 2000 
40 A Training System for the 21st Century: JPATS and the T-6, Richard H Emmons, June 2004, Page 21 
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The Milestone 0/I review was held on January 19, 1993. The resulting JPATS Acquisition 
Decision Memorandum (ADM) stated that “the source selection criteria must clearly favor 
proposals involving the lowest development risk and the lowest total system cost to the 
Government.”41 USD(Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics [AT&L]) then designated the Air 
Force as the lead Service and required that the Air Force obtain approval of the Acquisition 
Strategy Report, documenting a two-contract approach with sequential aircraft and GBTS 
competitions. 
 
JPATS acquisition officials continued to retain the two-contract approach, and, on May 19, 1993, 
USD(AT&L) convened a second Milestone I review. The Chairman recommended that 
USD(AT&L) approve the single airframe/GBTS contract and that the Air Force improve 
accessibility of the JPATS aircraft to women by adjusting the anthropometric thresholds. 
 
Congress felt the need to become involved. The authorization committees stated that the JPATS 
should proceed with the single contract strategy. The Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) met in 
May 1993 to find a compromise. The compromise called for the acquisition of a non- 
developmental aircraft and that the airframe contractor would have total system performance 
responsibility. Once the airframe contractor was selected, the Government would hold a GBTS 
competition with airframe contractor input. The selected GBTS contractor would then become a 
major subcontractor to the airframe contractor. This would still allow the Government to get the 
best airframe and best GBTS while having a single POC. 
 
The ADM approved the single contract strategy on July 7, 1993, with two stipulations: “The first 
stipulation was to limit acquisition costs to the greatest extent possible and the second was to 
ensure JPATS is fully consistent with DOD’s policies on women in combat.”42  Also, in July 
1993, HQ Air Force redesignated ATC as the Air Education and Training Command (AETC). 
With this change, AETC also had responsibility for Air University and its education mission. 
 
3.2.5.1     Accommodate for Female Population 
 
The new USD for Acquisition, Mr. John Deutch, reviewed this new strategy and added another 
stipulation. JPATS had to follow DoD’s policy of supporting women in combat and be equally 
accessible to the same percentage of men and women. If that could not be accomplished, then the 
JPATS had to be accessible to at least 80 percent of the female population. 
 
Mr. Deutch wanted the next draft RFP to contain source selection factors striving for lowest 
developmental risk and lowest total system cost. Acquisition costs were to be limited to the 
maximum extent possible. The contractors were to be asked for acquisition streamlining 
recommendations that would reduce cost. References to military specifications, standards, and 
service regulations were to be kept to a minimum. He also wanted a new Trainer Master Plan. 43 
 
3.2.5.2     ORD Number 3 
 
The third version of the ORD was released in September 1993. The changes in this version 
mainly dealt with the number of aircraft, instructor pilot training, and sequence of training 
location stand-up. The total number of aircraft was now 711, somewhat lower than the 765 
 
 
 
41 Ibid, Page 24 
42 Ibid, Page 24 
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originally anticipated. The instructor pilot training date slipped, and the first instructors would be 
trained at the contractor’s facility. 44 
 
3.2.6     Draft Request for Proposals (RFP) Developed 
 
Finally, the draft RFP, including all of the actions from the ADM, was ready. It was not well 
received at the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) review. Senior leaders felt it fell short 
of acquisition reform ideals. It was too long at 1,000 pages and contained too much specific 
direction and not enough performance-based requirements. It also referenced numerous military 
specifications and standards that were not in step with the move to commercial practices and 
processes under acquisition reform. It was obvious that the RFP would not make it out of OSD, 
so Ms. Darleen Druyan, from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (SAF) for 
Acquisition, formed a Red Team to scrub and streamline the RFP. The team cut the page count 
25 percent, deleted the “how to” language, cut down references to military specifications and 
standards to 64, and reduced the data requirements by 50 percent. They also recommended a 
change to the GBTS acquisition strategy. The acquisition strategy from the DAB put the 
Government in charge of selecting a GBTS contractor with airframe contractor input. This 
strategy made the Government culpable if GBTS problems arose. The new strategy proposed by 
the Red Team put the airframe contractor in charge with Government input.45 
 
In March 1994, the Assistant SAF for Acquisition held a review of the JPATS program. As a 
result, the contract strategy was changed to require that the prime contractor select the GBTS 
contractor instead of the Government per the recommendations of the Red Team. The Defense 
Acquisition Executive concurred and signed the Acquisition Strategy Report on May 17, 1994.46 
 
3.2.7     Defense Acquisition Pilot Program (DAPP) 
 
Acquisition streamlining continued to be emphasized. FASA provided the initial impetus, but 
changing the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FARs) and Defense Federal Acquisition 
Regulations Supplement (DFARS) and DoD 5000 series took time. DoD developed DAPPs to 
showcase  the  cost  and  schedule  savings  of  Acquisition  Reform.  The  purpose  of  the  pilot 
programs was “to demonstrate new and innovative approaches in the use of commercial practices 
and  the acquisition of commercial products.”47 
Reform, particularly in the following areas: 
The pilot  programs emphasized  Acquisition 
 
1.  Commercial Practices, Processes, and Products, whereby the Government acquisition 
process would use the commercial practices, processes, and products to the maximum 
extent practicable. 
 
2.   Affordability, whereby acquisition managers would use total budget and requirement 
trade-offs to achieve target prices by world-class techniques. 
 
DAPPs could implement the provisions of FASA before the regulations were published and 
could use commercial item exemptions for non-commercial items. They also  had expedited 
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deviation authority from the FAR/DFAR and DoD 5000 series regulations. They essentially had 
carte blanche authority to become as commercial-like as possible. 
 
The DUSD(AR) recommended that JPATS become a DAPP. Mr. Deutch, USD at that time, 
concurred with the recommendation and formally designated the program as a DAPP. 
 
3.2.8     RFP Released 
 
The new RFP containing the changes from the Red Team and acquisition streamlining changes 
allowed by the designation as a DAPP was released on May 18, 1994. The Key Performance 
Parameters are listed in Figure 9. 
 
Key Parameters Threshold Objective 
Syllabus Maneuvers and Mission 
Profiles (Contact/Familiarization, 
Instruments, Formation, Navigation- 
High and Low, Training Mission 
Accomplishment) 
Accomplish all five 
mission profiles 
Same 
Operational G Envelope (Gs) +6 to –3 
+4 to 0 asymmetric 
+7 to -3 
+4 to 0 asymmetric 
Sustained Speed (1,000 feet MSL, hot 
day) 
250 KTAS (270 KTAS 
Dash) 
270 KTAS 
Ejection Seat Envelope with Survival 
Kit 
0 FT - 60 KTS 0 FT - 0 KTS 
Pressurization (psi differential) 3.5 psi Diff 5.0 psi Diff 
Able to Perform An Engine Out 
Landing 
To Runway Unprepared Surface 
Birdstrike Capability (4 pound bird, no 
catastrophic damage) 
270 KTAS Max low level A/S 
Cockpit Seating Configuration Stepped Tandem 0 degree over-the- 
nose visibility from 
the rear cockpit at 
design eye height 
Anthropometric Accommodation 
(Sitting height) 
32.8 to 40 inches 31 to 40 inches 
Cockpit Configuration Able to be operationally 
flown from either 
cockpit 
Interchangeable 
Instructor/Student 
Takeoffs/Touch and Go/Land (Wx, 
weight, configuration) at Main 
Operating Bases 
5,000 feet Runway 4,000 feet Runway 
Exterior Noise FAR Part 36, Most 
Restrictive Applicable 
Standard 
Same 
IFR Certified Instrumentation IFR Certified 
(Selectable EADI/EHSI) 
All digital except 
backups 
Visual System for IFT/OFT Provide a visual field of 
view commensurate 
with the JPPT syllabus 
training requirements 
Same 
Figure 9. JPATS Key Performance Parameters48 
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3.2.9     Source Selection 
The source selection was a “best value” competitive source selection as delineated in FAR Part 
15  and  the  Air  Force  FAR  Supplement  for  aircraft  and  logistics  support.  The  best  value 
acquisition  considering  development  risk  and  total  system  life-cycle  cost  was  determined 
through proposal evaluation of a number of factors. The JPATS evaluation factors 49 were: 
 
A.  Operational Utility/Technical 
 
a.   O.1 Operational Capability (includes flight evaluations) 
 
b.   O.2 Crew Accommodation 
 
c.   O.3 Structural Integrity (Service Life) 
 
d.   O.4 Certification/Qualification 
e.   O.5 Aircraft Missionization 
f. O.6 System Safety 
 
B.  Manufacturing and Quality Assurance 
a.   P.1 Manufacturing 
b.   P.2 Production Control and Quality Assurance 
 
C.  Cost/Price 
 
D.  Logistics Support 
 
a.   L.1 Acquisition Logistics 
 
b.   L.2 Contractor Logistics Support CLS) 
E.  Management 
a.   M.1 Aircraft Management 
 
b.   M.2 GBTS Support and GBTS Management 
 
F.  Schedule 
 
The factors are listed in descending order of relative importance with Manufacturing/Quality 
Assurance slightly more important than Cost. Factors O.1 and O.2 are of equal importance, and 
Factors O.3 through O.6 are of equal importance. Individually, Factors O.1 and O.2 are of 
greater importance than any single Factor O.3 through O.6. The Factors under 
Manufacturing/Quality Assurance are of equal importance. The Factors under Logistics are of 
equal importance, and the Factors under Management are of equal importance. 
 
When the RFP was released, the only discussions that could be held with the bidders were 
through the Contracting Officer. Communications were terminated effectively at  the worker 
level. 
 
The risk in two areas was assessed during source selection. A proposal risk assessment evaluated 
the bidders’ proposed approach to fulfill the requirements, and a performance risk assessment 
evaluated the bidders’ past and present performance. 
 
49 Joint Primary Aircraft Training System Request for Proposals, F33657-94-R-0006 
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3.2.9.1     Requirements and Goals 
The System Requirements Document (SRD) in the RFP served as the foundation for defining the 
JPATS requirements. The SRD contained numerous TBDs (To Be Determined), which were 
accompanied by a combination of requirements (“required” or “minimum required”) and goals 
(“desired”). One example that mixes both requirements and goals is in the area of 
anthropomorphics, Figure 10, which is not surprising given the high interest in accommodating 
the greatest percentage of female pilots possible. 
 
Other specific examples include: 
 
•   The service life of the aircraft fleet will be sufficient for TBD years (24 years 
desired) 
 
•   The aircraft will cruise at altitudes up to TBD (18,000 feet mean sea level [MSL] 
minimum required) 
 
•   The aircraft will maintain a low-level cruise speed of TBD (250 KTAS required; 
270 KTAS desired) 
 
•   The aircraft  will take off and  climb  from sea  level to  18,000  feet  MSL at 
maximum takeoff gross weight and within established engine operating 
limitations in TBD minutes or less (8 minutes desired) 
 
•   The aircraft will not exceed TBD Maintenance Man-hours Per flight Hour (4.25 
desired) 
 
•   The aircraft Turnaround Time will not exceed TBD minutes (30 minutes desired) 
 
The numerous TBDs embedded in the SRD caused confusion among the bidders, particularly 
those not familiar in doing business with the Government. Many wanted clarification as to which 
goals were more important than the others, since the contractors all wanted to provide the “best 
value” to the Government. Some of the aircraft being bid were truly off-the-shelf, and from a 
goal perspective, you get what you get. Other companies were bidding modified off-the-shelf 
and had some leeway to make changes to try to achieve these goals. The Government could not 
tell an individual bidder which goal was more valuable than another, since it would give the 
bidder an unfair advantage. 
 
3.2.9.2     Flight Evaluations 
 
Seven contractors submitted proposals (see Figure 11). The RFP stated that flight evaluations 
would comprise a portion of the Operational Capability factor. Flight evaluations began in July 
1994 with the Grumman/Agusta Team and S-211 turbofan. Vought/Fabrica Militair De Avionics 
with the turbofan PAMPA 2000 was next, followed by the Rockwell/Deutche Aerospace-MBB 
Ranger2000. Cessna was next with its twin turbofan CitationJet, and Northrop/Embraer followed 
with  the  Tucano  H.  Lockheed/Aermacchi  provided  the  MB-339,  and,  lastly,  Beech/Pilatus 
brought  their  Mk  II  Turboprop,  which  was  a  derivative  of  the  Pilatus  PC-9.  The  flight 
evaluations were held at WPAFB and included a combined test force of Air Force and Navy 
pilots. The Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center (AFOTEC) also had pilots at the 
evaluations to perform an Early Operational Assessment. 
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Figure 10. System Requirements Document (SRD) Anthropometry, Required versus Desired 
 
3.2.9.3     Jet Versus Turboprop 
 
Throughout the process so far, the type and number of power plants required was not specifically 
addressed. The Air Force’s motto had been “an all jet Air Force.” The entire Air Force hierarchy 
had been attuned to this throughout their careers. The idea of taking a step backwards into the 
world of propellers was not an easy adjustment to make. Their whole paradigm might have to be 
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changed. True to the ideals of Acquisition Reform, the power plant requirement was never 
identified, just the performance requirements and flight envelope. The type and number would be 
fallout from all of the other requirements and best value source selection evaluation. 
 
 
AIRCRAFT TYPE 
 
POPULAR NAME 
UNITED STATES 
MANUFACTURER/FOREIGN 
MANUFACTURER 
Turboprop EMB-312HJ Northrop/Embraer (Brazil) 
 Beech Mk II Beech/Pilatus (Switzerland) 
Jet (single engine) MB-339 T-Bird II Lockheed/Aermacchi (Italy) 
 Pampa 2000 Vought/FMA (Argentina) 
 Ranger 2000 Rockwell/DASA (Germany) 
 S211A Grumman/Agusta (Italy) 
Jet (twin engine) Citation Jet Cessna 
Figure 11. Proposed JPATS Aircraft 
 
3.2.9.4     Beech Aircraft Selected 
 
Dr. Sheila E. Widnall, SAF, announced the selection of Beech Aircraft Corporation to develop 
the JPATS on June 22, 1995. The program called for the delivery of 711 aircraft, 372 for the Air 
Force and 339 for the Navy. The program budget was $7 billion, which included development, 
manufacturing,  and  initial support. Two  contracts would  be used,  one  for  missionizing  the 
aircraft and a second for CLS. Once these contracts were in place, Beech would begin source 
selection for the GBTS portion of the system. 50 
 
The RFP asked the bidders for any alternate proposals that would streamline the acquisition 
process and decrease cost. Beech had proposed several initiatives that were accepted by the 
Government and resulted in reduced life-cycle costs. Using their own certified Earned Value 
Management System (EVMS) streamlined the process and reduced the amount of oversight and 
contract management, which resulted in a cost savings. They also changed the paint scheme. 
Five coats of the color white specified by AETC would be required to cover the primer, but, by 
using another color white, only two coats would be required. Beech also planned to put primer 
on  piece  parts,  including  rivet  holes,  before  assembly,  which  would  improve  corrosion 
prevention. They also made their subcontractors switch from safety wire to self-locking screws, 
which eliminated the cost of safety wire, reduced FOD, and reduced manufacturing and life- 
cycle costs. They also had Pratt & Whitney add a wash ring to the engine inlet. This allowed 
maintenance personnel to flush the engine further, improving corrosion control.51 
 
It should be noted that Beech Aircraft Corporation had been a subsidiary to the Raytheon 
Corporation since 1980. Following a corporate realignment in September 1994, they became 
RAC. Paragraph 2.4 depicts Beech’s history from inception to the present. 
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3.2.9.5     Protests 
 
Immediately following the selection of RAC, Lockheed filed a protest with the Government 
Auditing Agency. Cessna, a division of Textron, also filed a protest citing their superior product 
and shortcomings of Raytheon’s product: 
 
“You can do more with a twin engine, you tend to have a longer service life and 
that will cut costs,” Textron Cessna spokesman Dave Franson said. Franson added 
that the Raytheon52 JPATS candidate is “not suitable” for the Air Force and Navy. 
Textron has also said that Raytheon aircraft’s ejection seat is not suitable for all 
female pilots. In its Government Auditing Agency protest, the company alleged 
that the Raytheon airplane was not tested properly to determine whether women 
can work the control stick or eject safely. 53 
 
Rockwell also followed suit and filed a protest. Lockheed subsequently withdrew its protest. 
Both Cessna and Rockwell complained that “the JPATS winner was chosen based on the lowest 
bid, and not on ‘best value,’ which bidders were told would be the basis for selection.”54 
 
The Government Auditing Agency denied both protests, and the contract was finally awarded on 
February 1, 1996. RAC then selected Flight Safety Services to develop the GBTS. 
 
3.2.10   Official Designation of T-6A Texan II 
 
Under normal circumstances, naming a new aircraft by a single service is not a quick and easy 
process. In this case, there were two Services trying to establish the designation for the new 
trainer. The candidate designations were the T-6A Mustang II, T-6A Mark II, and T-6A Texan 
II. The Air Force and Navy Training Commands agreed on the T-6A Texan II because of the 
huge role the North American T-6 had in training both Services’ pilots in World War II and 
beyond. 55 
 
3.3      Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) Phase 
 
The protests delayed the contract award for seven months. During that time, RAC tweaked their 
design, even though the effort was unfunded. Once the protests were resolved and the contract 
was awarded, EMD officially began. 
 
3.3.1      EMD Contract 
 
The EMD contract was a fixed price incentive-firm with an award fee. It included the 
development of an instrumented manufacturing development aircraft (Lot 1), as well as seven 
production options. The initial contract was awarded under FAR Part 15 (Contracting by 
Negotiations) and, thus, had most of the regulations and reporting requirements of a typical Air 
Force development contract. In an effort to become more “commercial like” consistent with 
acquisition reform, JPATS used its designation as a DAPP to pursue relief from certain statutory 
and regulatory requirements. These requirements were inherently governmental and virtually 
non-existent in a commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) acquisition. Figures 12 and 13 identify the 
 
 
52 The reference states “Textron” which is likely a typo 
53 GAO ruling on Textron's JPATS protest expected next week. (Joint Primary Aircraft Training System contract 
awarded to Raytheon's Beech Aircraft), Defense Daily, 2 February 1996 
54“Rockwell joins protest at JPATS selection”, Flight International, 8 February 1995 
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JPATS regulatory and statutory relief. Except for the areas of “Special Test Equipment” and 
“Value Engineering,” the regulatory relief did not impact systems engineering. 56 
 
The contract included a number of elements key to systems engineering, as reflected in Section 
H,  Special  Requirements  and  Statement  of  Work  (SOW).  The  contract  also  included  an 
Integrated Master Plan (IMP) and product specification (i.e., PIPFS). 
 
FAR 52.203.4 Contingent fee representation and agreement 
FAR 52.203-5 Covenant against contingent fees 
FAR 52.209-6 Protecting Government interests when subcontracting 
with contractors debarred, suspended, or proposed for 
disbarment 
DFARS 252.203-7001 Special prohibition on employment 
DFARS 252.242.7004 Material management and accounting system 
FAR 52.203.7 Anti-kickback procedures 
FAR 52.223-5 Certificate for drug-free workplace 
FAR 52.223-6 Drug-free workplace 
Figure 12. JPATS Statutory Relief 
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FAR 52.212-9 Variation in Quantity 
FAR 52.229-5 Taxed-contracts performed in United States 
possessions or Puerto Rico 
FAR 52.232-1 Payments 
FAR 52.232-2 Payments under fixed-price R&D Ks 
FAR 52.232-9 Limitations on withholding of payments 
FAR 52.232-11 Extras 
FAR 52.245-18 Special test equipment 
FAR 52.246-11 Higher-level contract quality requirement 
(Government spec) 
FAR 52.247-1 Commercial Bill of Lading 
FAR 52.247-65 FOB origin prepaid freight-small packages 
DFARS 252.242-7003 Application for United States Government Shipping 
Docs/Instructions 
FAR 52.222 Notice to Government of labor disputes 
FAR 52.248-1 Value engineering 
DFARS 252.203-7002 Display of DoD hotline poster 
DFARS 52.242-7000 Post-award conference 
DFARS 252.208-7000 Intent to furnish precious metals as GFM 
FAR 52.244-1 Subcontracts (fixed price contracts) 
DFARS 252.209-7000 Acquisition from subcontractors subject to on-site 
inspection under INF treaty 
DFARS 252.210-7003 Acquisition streamlining 
DFARS 252.234-7000 Notice of Cost/Schedule Control systems 
Figure 13. JPATS Regulatory Relief 
 
Section H - Special Contract Requirements 
 
Section  H  contained  several  requirements  that  supported  the  systems  engineering  process 
directly. Although JPATS was to be as “commercial like” as possible, the Government had their 
unique requirements that required some method of Government insight and risk management. 
The Section H requirements were used to address the implementation and management of these 
unique requirements. The “Required Demonstration Milestones” were defined to lay in a top- 
level disciplined systems engineering framework. They include: 
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1.   Required Demonstration Milestones 
• Aircraft Preliminary Design Review (PDR) Complete 
• Aircraft Critical Design Review (CDR) Complete 
• GBTS Contract Change Proposal (CCP) Definitized 
• First Shipset of Aircraft Components for GBTS Delivered 
• Final Design Data for GBTS Delivered 
• All Major Flight Conditions to Ultimate Load on Static Test Article Complete 
• Birdstrike/Ejection System Testing Complete 
• Physical Configuration Audit (PCA) Complete 
• One Lifetime of Durability Testing Complete 
• Two Lifetimes of Durability Testing Complete 
 
2.   Configuration Management 
• The contractor will be responsible for the functional and allocated baseline of the 
JPATS program 
 
3.   Specification and Standards 
• JPATS aircraft will be designed according to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 
standards and FAA-approved contractor standards and processes and certified by the 
FAA 
• Military specifications and standards will be used when there are no applicable FAA 
standards or FAA-approved contractor standards and processes or when a military 
specification or standard is specifically required by the terms and conditions of this 
contract 
4.   Integrated Product Development 
• Both the contractor and Government will use integrated product development for the 
JPATS program 
5.   EVMS 
• The contractor may manage the JPATS contract using his own EVMS 
• Note: The Government’s intent is to use the contractor’s EVMS for integrating and 
inter-relating the technical, schedule, and cost parameters associated with contract 
performance 
6.   Commercial Items 
• The contractor will maximize the use of DFARS 211.70 when acquiring commercial 
items from subcontractors or suppliers. DFARS 211.70 objectives are to acquire a 
system that  meets stated  performance  requirements while  avoiding  over- 
specification and ensuring that cost-effective requirements are included in the 
acquisition 
 
SOW 
 
The SOW was reasonably comprehensive and contained a number of additional elements key to 
the systems engineering process. The Government was acquiring a COTS trainer aircraft, but, 
initially, they would be the only customer. Without a viable alternative trainer aircraft or larger 
customer base to provide leverage over the contractor, the Government would be locked into this 
T-6A Texan II Engineering Case Study 
 
Page - 33 
 
 
 
JPATS. The SOW included risk management tasks similar to typical developmental acquisition 
programs to mitigate the risk. These additional elements include: 
 
• Aircraft Structural Integrity Program (ASIP) 
 
• Structural Force Management Program 
 
• Engine Structural Integrity Program (ENSIP) 
 
• Program Status Reviews 
 
• Aircraft System Test and Evaluation 
 
• Aircraft Data Requirements 
 
• Logistics Support Analysis 
 
• Corrosion Prevention and Control Plan 
 
• Integrated Support Plan 
 
• Integrated Test Plan 
 
Data Rights 
 
In many ways, the T-6 contract was structured as a commercial buy but with Government 
involvement. The basic PC-9 design clearly met the COTS criteria, since it was an existing 
commercial design developed by Pilatus. However, in order to meet Government specification 
requirements,  numerous  design  changes  had  to  be  incorporated.  The  extensiveness  of  the 
changes even led many to state that the “T-6 is not a PC-9.” In order to experience the cost 
savings associated with a commercial acquisition, most of the changes to the basic PC-9 
configuration were developed similar to a commercial buy. As a result, the changes were 
generally developed at Raytheon’s expense, with the data (drawings, analyses, etc.) belonging 
solely to RAC or the subcontractors. However, RAC did have to show compliance to the 
Government requirements. Below is an example of how incorporation of a new “widget” was 
typically funded: 
 
Effort associated with presenting a concept to the Government Government-funded 
 
Establishing and implementing the design, creating drawings, etc. RAC-funded 
 
Testing Government-funded 
 
Drawing updates, tooling changes, Class II Engineering RAC-funded 
Change Proposals (ECPs) 
 
The result is that much of the data associated with the design changes are also proprietary, with 
the Government having only unrestricted data rights to the test reports. Without the data rights, 
the Government does not own the design and will be largely dependent upon Hawker Beechcraft 
for future modifications, design changes, and manufacturing of replacement parts. 
 
Even though most of the data are proprietary and involve limitations on the data distribution, the 
T-6 contract does have provisions allowing the Government access to the data. Below are the 
paragraphs from the SOW, which address the data provisions: 
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“3050.2.1 Contractor Existing Engineering Data File (EEDF) 
 
Beech shall maintain a Beech Mk II aircraft engineering data file and shall arrange for the 
Government to have access at Beech facility(ies) to all engineering data, and their reference 
documents, that describes the aircraft, including Beech Mk II new and modified features of all 
systems, subsystems, assemblies, and parts. All requests by the Government for copies of EEDF 
information will be in writing and will be signed by the Contracting Officer. (DI-A-3027A/T)” 
 
“3050.3.1 Data Accession List 
 
Beech shall provide the Government with access at Beech’s facility(ies) to internal documents 
which were produced to manage the JPATS program and to design, develop, and test the aircraft. 
Beech shall provide, upon written request, copies of all internal data generated in compliance 
with contractual tasks. Beech shall flow this Data Accession List requirement down to major 
subcontractors and include subcontractor data on the Data Accession List. Beech shall honor 
only those written requests for accession list data which are signed by the Contracting Officer. 
(DI-A-3027A/T)” 
 
The reality is that the contractor, for the most part, developed the data to  manufacture the 
airplane at their own expense, and, thus, the data are proprietary. The contractor continues to 
maintain the drawings, specifications, and other documents required for the parts and aircraft 
assembly through company funding, so the data remain proprietary. On the other hand, the T-6 
does have some Government-funded items. These items are typically related to documentation 
information, such as test reports, and the Government does have rights to these, since they 
provided the funding. The program documents are marked based on the contractual requirements 
in place for that particular activity. 
 
Per the SOW, the data listed on the Data Accession List (DAL) that are proprietary are provided 
to the Government freely with the condition that they are proprietary and marked so. Each DAL 
request is handled individually, only because some data on the DAL were generated through 
Government funding, and these would be marked in a different manner as stated above. While 
the contract states that the Contracting Officer is the official requestor for data either in the 
EEDF or DAL, the contractor and Program Office eventually established an agreement that these 
data   requests   would   be   signed   by  the   664th    Aeronautical  Systems   Squadron  (AESS) 
Configuration Manager to facilitate the activity. In addition to the EEDF and DAL, there are 
some data that are provided as specifically required in the contract per other Contract Data 
Requirements List (CDRL) requirements. 
 
IMP 
 
The IMP established at contract award contained 29 milestones, 102 accomplishments, and 458 
criteria. The IMP accomplishments, along with the corresponding criteria, were written around 
the major program milestones. The IMP included most of the required demonstration milestones 
included in Section H of the contract discussed above, as well as additional milestones. The 
milestones addressed in the IMP include: 
 
• Air Vehicle PDR 
• Air Vehicle CDR 
• Phase 1 Aircraft Data Package for GBTS 
• Training System Integration Review GBTS Joint Primary Pilot Training PDR 
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PIPFS 
• Second Shipset of AV Components for GBTS 
• Phase 2 Aircraft Data Package for GBTS 
• Flight Readiness Review (FRR) 
• Third Shipset of AV Components for GBTS 
• Fourth Shipset of AV Components for GBTS 
• GBTS Integration Review 
• AV Functional Configuration Audit (FCA) 
• AV PCA – Start 
• AV PCA – Completed 
• Phase 3 Aircraft Data Package for GBTS 
• AV Planning for Rate Review (PFRR) 
• Required Assets Available (RAA) at Randolph AFB 
• JPPT Small Group Tryout Started 
• Aircraft Deployment for Reese AFB, Texas 
• Two Lifetime Durability Test Completed 
• Preparation for GBTS Site Readiness Review (SRR) at Reese AFB Completed 
• FOC at Reese AFB 
• FOC at Laughlin AFB, Texas 
• FOC at Randolph AFB 
• FOC at Vance AFB, Oklahoma 
• FOC at Naval Air Station (NAS) Whiting Field, Florida 
• FOC at Columbus AFB, Mississippi 
• FOC at NAS Corpus Christi, Texas 
• FOC at Sheppard AFB, Texas 
• FOC at NAS Pensacola, Florida 
 
In concert with being designated as a DAPP that focused on the objectives of acquisition reform, 
the PIPFS referenced only a limited number of military specifications and standards, i.e., 17 
specifications and 21 standards. The PIPFS was still a 140-page document with 1,250 individual 
requirements needing verification, but it focused more on the system-level requirements instead 
of detailed design solutions. The specification addressed requirements related to areas, such as: 
 
• Operational Service Life 
 
• Aerodynamic Performance 
 
• Flying Qualities 
 
• Reliability 
 
• Maintainability and Availability 
 
• Environmental Conditions 
 
• Materials, Processes, and Parts 
 
• Electromagnetic Effects 
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• Identification and Marking 
 
• Safety 
 
• Human Performance and Human Engineering 
 
• Structural Requirements 
 
• Flight Controls 
 
• Utility Systems 
 
• Propulsion 
 
• Avionics 
 
• Crew Systems 
 
• Support Equipment 
 
• Facilities 
 
• Packaging, Handling, Storage, and Transportation 
 
Shortly after EMD contract award, both the SPO and RAC engineers realized that certain 
requirements were not in the PIPFS. For example, there was a requirement to cool the cockpit 
and avionics, but there was no heating requirement. Following this realization, RAC and SPO 
management agreed that, for a short period of time, requirements could be added to the 
specification if the RAC and SPO engineers agreed. Unfortunately, some requirements took 
longer to define than the agreed to period of time, and, sometimes, the extensiveness of the 
change required an ECP to implement. 
 
3.3.2      Organizational Structure 
 
The JPATS program organized according to Integrated Product Teams (IPTs). Throughout the 
entire program, the emphasis has been on teaming between the Government Program Office and 
prime contractor. The Chief Engineer for both the Government and contractor is responsible for 
technical management and systems engineering. Both the Government and contractor have 
organized according to the three basic elements of the JPATS program: Air Vehicle, GBTS, and 
Sustainment. 
 
Government 
 
The JPATS program is managed by the 664 AESS, formerly the JPATS SPO. From program 
inception, the Program Office has been organized using IPTs. The structure has changed slightly 
with time as the focus of the program has changed. However, Figure 14 is a representative 
depiction of the engineering organization over time. As the figure shows, there is a separate 
Systems Integration IPT, which interacts with the functional areas to ensure that all appropriate 
systems engineering activities are accomplished. The team focuses on systems engineering 
planning, process development and execution, risk management, scheduling and schedule 
tracking, deficiency reporting, etc. All of the IPTs also have formal representation and 
participation from the Systems Integration IPT. 
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Figure 14. Government Engineering Organization 
 
The contractor has also been organized according to IPTs since program inception. Like the 
Government,  the  contractor  has  tweaked  their  IPT  structure over  time  as  the  program  has 
changed in product focus, phase, etc. However, the basic structure has been retained as depicted 
in  Figure 15.  Within  each  IPT, there are representatives,  as appropriate,  from each of the 
involved disciplines, e.g., Engineering, Manufacturing, Producibility, Quality Assurance, Test, 
Safety, Program Management, Configuration/Data Management, etc. Key to the operation of the 
IPTs is the concept that each contractor IPT has a designated Government counterpart to 
participate  in  discussions,  decisions,  etc.  The  Chief  Engineer,  along  with  his  deputy,  is 
responsible for implementing systems engineering across all the IPTs. They ensure that the 
company’s  “best  commercial  practices”  are  implemented.  These  practices  often  involve 
processes necessary to obtain FAA certification. There is no one specifically identified as a 
systems engineer that is assigned to the IPTs, nor is there a separate Systems Engineering IPT. 
Instead, the Chief Engineer chooses IPT leaders who are knowledgeable and experienced with 
their systems engineering processes. 
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Figure 15. Contractor Engineering Organization 
 
3.3.3      Design Evolution 
 
The T-6A design evolved from the Pilatus PC-9, which was one of the aircraft AETC included in 
their early fact-finding trips to Europe. Pilatus teamed with Beech in 1991. The team knew that 
the  baseline  needed  significant  modifications  to  satisfy  the  mission  requirements.  These 
included: 
 
A.  Anthropometric Considerations – Accommodate 80 percent of the female population 
B.  Improved Flight Characteristics – Forgiving handling qualities for student pilots 
C.  Pressurized Cockpit 
D.  Canopy and Structure Birdproofing 
E.  Increased Power 
F.  Single Point Pressure Refueling and Defueling 
G.  New Avionics Suite 
H.  Increased Reliability and Maintainability 
I. Zero-Zero Ejection Seat – A JSORD objective 
J. Linear Power Response – More jet-like acceleration characteristics (minimize prop 
torque) 
 
A PC-9, Serial Number (S/N) 176, was procured by Beech and used as the baseline aircraft. 
Beech flew over 500 demonstrations and evaluation flights in the 1990 time period to determine 
what changes were needed to successfully meet their requirements. The debriefings from those 
flights formed the basis of their requirements and design document. In 1991, the contractor built 
the first prototype, PT-1. The modifications included installation of the more powerful Pratt & 
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Whitney PT6A-68 and a new canopy. This prototype was used to evaluate the handling qualities 
with the modifications. The next prototype, the PT-2, was built the following year and was fully 
missionized. The tail, rudder, and elevator were redesigned. The only parts Pilatus supplied were 
the wing assembly, a portion of the aft  fuselage, the landing gear, the vapor cycle cooling 
system, and miscellaneous parts. First flight took place on December 23, 1992. The flight test 
program for PT-2 evaluated flutter characteristics through a greater flight envelope; validated 
flying  qualities,  including  common  student  errors;  evaluated  a  new  trim  aid  device;  and 
evaluated aircraft flight, including takeoff and landing performance. 
 
PT-3 was built in 1993 and included modifications, such as a canted instrument panel, liquid 
crystal displays, a reshaped ejection seat head box, and numerous maintainability improvements. 
First flight was July 29, 1993. PT-3 was used for continued flight testing, flutter, flying qualities 
validation,  performance  checks,  and  final  systems  checks.  It  was  also  used  for  the  source 
selection evaluation flights, was the FAA conformity article, and performed initial FAA 
certification flights. 
 
Below is a summary of the more significant design changes leading up to source selection: 
 
• “New aft fuselage for improved flying qualities 
• New canopy shape for pressurization 
• New cowling to reduce maintenance time 
• Integration of external shapes for enhanced handling characteristics 
• PT-6A-68 engine integration 
– Digital engine control for jet-like performance 
– Increased horsepower for excellent aerobatics 
– Continuous inertial separator for FOD protection 
• Single-point refueling for minimum turnaround time 
• Zero altitude/zero airspeed ejection seat for maximum student safety 
• Bird-strike canopy for pilot protection in low-altitude training environment 
• Fuselage enhancements 
– Cockpit redesigned to accommodate widest range of pilot body sizes 
– Pressurization and larger air conditioner for crew comfort 
– Large aft fuselage avionics bays to reduce maintenance man-hours 
– Improved seat installation hardware to expedite replacement 
• Active-matrix LCD displays that improved sunlight readability 
• State-of-the-art avionics for maximum training benefit and lower life-cycle costs 
• Environmentally friendly HFC air-conditioning system 
• Avionics mounted one deep in aft bay to speed maintenance on the line 
• Replacement of safety wire with captive nut plates to eliminate foreign-object damage 
(FOD) hazard 
• Wing rotated forward 1.5 degrees nose up to improve visibility for instructor”57 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
57 Dispelling the Myth, http://www.hawkerbeechcraft.com/military/t-6a/not_pc_9.pdf, Hawker Beechcraft 
Corporation, Copyright 2007, Pages 1 to 3, 28 July 2009 
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RAC continued to refine the design while the contract protests were being resolved. The 
improvements included: 
 
• Airframe Improvements 
- DADT Designed Wing 
- Bird Strike Resistant Leading Edges for Wing and Empennage 
- Structural Beef-Ups 
- Design Updates for Manufacturing 
• Propulsion Improvements 
- Single Point Refueling Nozzle Moved to Left Side 
- Automatic Fuel Balancing 
• Systems Improvements 
- Onboard Oxygen Generating System 
- 13 FPS Landing Gear 
- Heavy Duty Brakes 
• Avionics Improvements 
- GPS – KLN-900 
- VHF and UHF Radio 
 
All of this significant  development  activity, which was before contract  award, was entirely 
funded by the contractor. 
 
Following EMD contract award, additional changes were made in establishing the final 
production configuration. These include: 
 
• “Maintenance-free hydraulic accumulator 
• New hydraulics system, wheel and brakes to reduce maintenance man-hours 
• Advanced surface sealing for optimal corrosion protection 
• 18,720-hour fatigue life design … 
• Removable vertical stabilizer to reduce maintenance workload 
• ON-condition engine hot-section inspections 
• 4,500-hour time between engine overhaul – highest in its category 
• Wing enhancements 
– Integral aerobatic fuel tanks for reduced maintenance 
– Exposed wing spar to facilitate inspectability 
– Removable bird-strike leading edge to reduce repair costs 
– +7 to -3.5 G capability to maximize training 
– Designed with consideration of future external store”58 
 
The bottom line is that almost every system on the PC-9 was redesigned, and almost every 
component was reprocured to obtain an FAA-certifiable aircraft that satisfied Government 
requirements. The Government requirements addressed the differences between commercial 
versus military missions, design usage, and Government-unique requirements. However, no 
information could be found concerning any studies that may have been done to determine the 
JPATS cost savings associated with starting with the PC-9 design as opposed to starting with a 
totally new design. 
 
 
 
58 Ibid, Page 4 
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3.3.4      Requirements Verification Process 
 
The T-6A program developed a good systems engineering approach to requirements verification. 
Their process was embedded within the IMP. The IMP identified the initial program integration 
planning processes and overall program process that had to be developed, including the ASIP, 
ENSIP, and System Safety Plan. The Air Force and Navy systems engineers in the Program 
Office developed a requirements traceability plan. They laid out the 1,250 PIPFS requirements 
and their verification in notebooks with one page for each requirement/verification. Closing out a 
requirement required signatures by the RAC and Air Force subject matter expert (SME), 
signifying that the requirement had been verified. Some requirements also required the systems 
safety and program manager’s signature. Verification methods included demonstration, analysis, 
ground test, and flight test. 
 
Verification of requirements involving flight test became an issue. First and foremost, the T-6A 
was to be FAA-certified to FAR Part 23. In RAC’s eyes, this testing had first priority. The 
Government was not totally familiar with FAA certification requirements and how a combined 
flight test program could achieve verification of both FAA and PIPFS requirements. This 
unfamiliarity required a great deal of research to identify where the requirement were similar or 
different. 
 
SPO engineers attended some component qualification tests but relied heavily upon the flight test 
results to verify requirements. 
 
3.3.5      Qualification Test and Evaluation (QT&E) 
 
The QT&E phase of the T-6A program consisted of two elements: 1) airworthiness certification 
by the FAA and 2) military verification testing. The two elements of QT&E were integrated into 
a single test program with tests sometimes satisfying both elements. Throughout the QT&E, the 
Government pilots worked side-by-side with the RAC pilots. 
 
QT&E occurred at Wichita, Kansas, between June 1996 and February 2000. An Integrated Test 
Team (ITT) was formed to support FAA certification and military qualification. The ITT 
consisted of Air Force, Navy, RAC, and FAA personnel. One Air Force and one Navy test pilot 
and two Air Force flight test engineers were permanently assigned to the Wichita test facility. 
The on-site team was augmented on an “as needed” basis by one Air Force and two Navy 
members from Edwards AFB, California, and NAS Patuxent River, Maryland. The test program 
was originally planned with two aircraft, but, as the plan matured, one prototype and four aircraft 
(PT-4 through PT-7) were flown. Testing consisted of 871 flights encompassing 1,095 hours. 
Below is a description of the two individual elements of QT&E. 
 
3.3.5.1     Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Certification 
 
Background: In order for a military aircraft to operate in civil airspace, the aircraft has to be 
certified as airworthy either by the military branch of service or FAA. 
 
When the Air Force certifies an aircraft, it uses the following three-step process: 
1.  Development and approval of a Tailored Airworthiness Certification Criteria (TACC) 
document  for use as the basis of certification. Military Handbook (MIL-HDBK)-516 
defines the criteria to be tailored. 
 
2.  Design evaluated against the criteria contained in the TACC, using a combination of 
analysis, laboratory, simulator, flight, and demonstration data to verify compliance. 
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3.  All non-compliances assessed for operational safety risks and all identified risks accepted 
by the appropriate authority. 
 
The process is controlled by the Aeronautical Systems Center (ASC) Airworthiness Board at 
WPAFB, and the TACC requires coordination of the functional experts within the ASC 
Engineering Directorate. 
 
When the FAA certifies the aircraft, it uses a very disciplined process involving FARs, Orders, 
Advisory Circulars, and Forms. Certification efforts must be conducted, and compliance must be 
determined by the FAA or designated representatives of the FAA. The rules governing FAA 
certification are relatively stable. They are based on years of experience, and it takes about seven 
years to publish a new rule. The day that a program applies for certification is the date that 
determines the rules that apply. There is some latitude available for a modification if a new rule 
results  in  significant  changes  to  the  existing  baseline  design.  Two  advantages  to  FAA 
certification of the T-6 were that the contractor is well versed on FAA certification, and the rules 
are reasonably fixed. 
 
There are three different certificates involved in certifying that an aircraft is safe to fly. They are: 
 
1.   Type Certificate, which is given to aerospace manufacturers by the FAA after it has been 
shown that the particular design meets all the regulatory requirements for safe flight 
under all normally conceived conditions. The Type Certificate Data Sheet (TCDS) is the 
part of the Type Certificate documenting the conditions and limitations necessary to meet 
the certification airworthiness requirements of the regulations. TCDSs are publicly 
available from the FAA, and TCDS A00009WI for the T-6 (Hawker Beechcraft 
Corporation 3000) is shown in Appendix C. 
 
2.  Standard Airworthiness Certificate, which is issued to an individual serial numbered 
aircraft. It indicates that the individual aircraft has been registered, has a Type Certificate, 
has been manufactured according to the Type Certificate, has been found to conform to 
its TCDS, and is in a condition safe for operations. In order to retain the Standard 
Airworthiness Certificate, the aircraft must be maintained according to the rules issued by 
the FAA. 
 
3.   Production Certificate, which serves as an approval document to manufacture duplicate 
aircraft under the FAA-approved type design. 
 
The FAA certification process is somewhat similar to the Air Force certification process. The 
overarching steps can be summarized as follows: 
 
1.   The manufacturer submits a certification plan for FAA Engineering approval. The plan 
documents how the applicant intends to demonstrate compliance with the applicable 
FARs. 
 
2.   The  FAA  or  its  designated  representatives  evaluate  the  design  against  the  criteria 
contained in the applicable FARs, using a combination of analysis, laboratory, simulator, 
flight, and demonstration data to verify compliance. Once compliance is ascertained, a 
Type Certificate (FAA Form 8110-9) is awarded. 
 
3.   The  manufacturing  facility  must  apply  for  and  obtain  a  Production  Certificate.  A 
Production Certificate is an approval (document) to manufacture duplicate products under 
an FAA-approved type design. 
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4.   For each serial numbered aircraft, the FAA or its designated representatives determine 
that the individual aircraft conforms to its TCDS and is in a condition safe for operations. 
Once compliance is determined, a Standard Airworthiness Certificate (FAA Form 8100- 
2) is granted for the individual aircraft. 
 
The FARs serve as the framework that address safe operation. They are not intended to drive the 
manufacturer to a design solution. One example is that Human Factors does not fully address the 
size of the pilot population; market sales will bear the fallout of any size limitations. However, it 
is worth noting that Human Factors for FAA certification is being addressed increasingly more 
over the last 10 years. Included in the certification rules for both Part 23 and Part 25 are very 
general requirements for items, such as pilot interface; use of color and instrument arrangement 
in displays; and messaging, to name a few. The anthropometrics are a critical parameter for 
JPATS and were dictated by more stringent requirements from the military. 
 
T-6A Certification Basis: The JPATS acquisition strategy was built around the concept of 
procuring a COTS aircraft that would be FAA-certified. Consequently, Section H (Special 
Contract Provisions) of the JPATS contract stated “…the JPATS Aircraft shall be designed in 
accordance with FAA standards and FAA approved Contractor standards and processes, and 
certified by the FAA. However, military specifications and standards shall be used when there 
are no applicable FAA standards or FAA approved Contractor standards and processes or when a 
military specification or standard is specifically required by the terms and conditions of this 
contract.”59 As a result, the T-6 was certified under FAR Part 23, Airworthiness Standards: 
Normal, Utility, Acrobatic, and Commuter Category Airplanes. 
 
FAA testing was given number one priority with Government tests occurring as time permitted. 
This allowed the FAA certification tests to proceed smoothly. Throughout the QT&E, the 
Government pilots worked side-by-side with the RAC pilots. However, only RAC or FAA pilots 
could conduct the FAR 23 tests and make the flight certification findings. This was because of 
the constraints of the FAA civil certification process and not a reflection on the technical 
competence of the military test pilots. As a result, many of the subjective handling qualities 
assessments associated with the PIPFS had to wait until after FAA certification was complete. 
 
Initial FAA certification was gained through the Aircraft Certification Office (ACO) in Wichita. 
Both the FAA Type Certificate and Production Certificate for the Model 3000 were granted in 
July 1999. The Model 3000 is the FAA-approved version of the T-6A. Appendix C contains a 
copy of the TCDS. On September 10, 2004, a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between the 
DoD and FAA was signed, creating the Military Certification Office (MCO) within the FAA. 
The MCO now provides the technical liaison and support to the DoD for certification of 
commercial derivative aircraft. DoD reimburses the FAA for the expenditures of the MCO. The 
MCO is located in Wichita. 
 
While FAA issued the Type Certificate and Production Certificate, it was unable to issue the 
individual aircraft Standard Airworthiness Certificates because of certain military qualified 
deviations. Thus, each aircraft delivered to the Government has several deviations written against 
it signifying that certain items on the aircraft do not conform to FAA-approved type design 
because of military deviations. The specific items not FAA-certified are: 
 
 
59 Award Contract, F33657-94-C-0006, Issued by USAF/AFMC to Beech Aircraft Corporation, Item H-011, 5 
February 1996, Page 48 
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1.   Onboard Oxygen Generating System (off-the-shelf Air Force design) 
 
2.   External Paint and Markings (military unique paint scheme) 
 
3.   Control Stick Grip (off-the-shelf Air Force design) 
 
4.   Angle of Attack (AOA) Indexer (format conflicts with civil display convention) 
 
5.   Various markings, decals, and annunciations in the cockpit unique to the military 
(e.g., in some instances, the military requires yellow/black markings, while the FAA 
requires red). 
 
6.   Footman  loops  on  the  glareshield,  so  the  Government  can  attach  an  additional 
storage bag in the cockpit. Because of the acrobatic category for the FAA, the 
contractor is unable to state that the storage method meets FAA requirements. 
 
7.   Rudder and Elevator Trim Actuator and Traffic Advisory/Vertical Speed Indicator. 
The Government wanted product improvements to these items before completion of 
FAA certification. These items were part of a recent  Change Proposal and will 
eventually become FAA-certified. 
 
The result is that each individual aircraft receives an FAA Form 8130-31, Statement of 
Conformity – Military Aircraft, instead of the Standard Airworthiness Certificate. The form 
contains three signatures: the signature of the Authorized Company Representative and the 
signature of the FAA Representative/Authorized Designee, stating that the individual aircraft has 
passed  the  FAA-required  ground  inspections  and  flight  tests,  and  the  signature  of  the 
Responsible Military Airworthiness Authority/Authorized Designee, stating that “The cognizant 
receiving military authority acknowledges the identified deviations to the FAA approved type 
design  for  the  subject   commercial  derivative   aircraft   and   is  responsible  to   determine 
airworthiness and final acceptance for the removal, or installation of, modifications, installations, 
or parts listed hereon.”60 The T-6 Chief Engineer is the Authorized Designee for the Responsible 
Military Airworthiness Authority. Figure 16 is a copy of a signed FAA Form 8130-31. By 
signing the form, the T-6 Program Office Chief Engineer is responsible for ensuring that: 
 
1.   Future modifications to the FAA-certified baseline obtains FAA Part 23 approval (or 
is listed on the FAA Form 8130-31). 
 
2.   Aircraft continues to conform to the approved FAA type design. 
 
3.   Aircraft is maintained according to the maintenance program approved by the FAA. 
 
4.   Aircraft is operated within the envelope defined by the FAA-approved flight manual. 
 
5.   Aircraft remains in a condition for safe operation. 
 
To  meet  these  requirements,  the  Chief  Engineer  must  work  closely  with  Configuration 
Management, Maintenance, Safety, and Engineering. 
 
In reality, the FAA will certify most anything for the Government except for a few items, such as 
warheads, chafes, and pyrotechnics, since these items violate FAA Civil Rules. Also, the FAA 
will not certify equipment that is not authorized for commercial use (e.g., Identification, Friend 
 
 
 
60 Statement of Conformity – Military Aircraft, FAA Form 8130-31, 24 April 2009, Page 1 
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or Foe [IFF]) or equipment that is subject to conditions or limitations prohibiting use by 
unauthorized parties in the civil environment. 
 
The FAA could have certified the Onboard Oxygen Generating System, but certification would 
have been time-consuming. Since the FAA has no experience with an Onboard Oxygen 
Generating System, they would have had to ask numerous questions, develop a position relative 
to minimum requirements, collect and review data, etc. Thus, it was a programmatic decision to 
proceed with the military qualification only, resulting in an FAA Form 8130-31 instead of the 
Standard Airworthiness Certificate. Similar logic was behind FAA not certifying the Control 
Stick Grip, which is identical to a proven Air Force design. 
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Figure 16. FAA Form 8130-31 
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3.3.5.2          Military Verification Testing 
 
The objective of the verification testing was to quantitatively and qualitatively evaluate the 
overall system performance, including flying qualities, avionics, and subsystems. Specific test 
objectives included: 
 
1.   Verification of the PIPFS according to the approved test plans and procedures 
 
2.   Verification of the Flight Manual 
 
3.   Collection of required flight data for the GBTS 
 
4.   Support of the AFOTEC operational assessments 
 
One of the realities of airworthiness certification is that the certification, whether military or 
FAA, does not satisfy many of the requirements required for military verification. Airworthiness 
focuses on safety, while military verification focuses on verification of the design against the 
PIPFS, which includes not only safety related requirements but also mission requirements. 
Likewise, while FAA certification and military related safety testing sometimes share the same 
test objectives, there are times when they do not. These unavoidable discrepancies in test 
objectives obviously resulted in some inefficiencies to the QT&E program. 
 
One example is that the Government had a broader responsibility to ensure that the design was 
fault  tolerant  relative  to  student  operation.  Testing  needed  to  address  errors  that  could  be 
expected from student operation, e.g., high-power entry into spins, rolling maneuvers at high 
power, low speeds at high power, propeller stress resulting in bearing touchdowns, etc., all of 
which could impact student safety. On the other hand, the FAA has an established set of test 
procedures to be used during the certification process, and these procedures assume that a 
qualified pilot will be flying the aircraft. Thus, these student error-type of conditions are outside 
the bounds of FAA certification and, therefore, not addressed in FAA requirements. The 
Government preferred changing the recommended FAA procedures to address one integrated set 
of testing, satisfying both qualified and student pilot operation, but it would have required the 
approval of the FAA, which is time-consuming and, therefore, costly. Thus, RAC elected to stay 
with the FAA-recommended procedures. 
 
The broad spectrum of “common student errors” was dictated by the contract specification for 
JPATS and not only included evaluating tolerance to spin/acrobatic errors but other errors in 
traffic pattern, formation, and instrument flight. Specifically, Paragraph 3.2.2.3 (Flying Qualities) 
of the PIPFS required: 
 
“The aircraft shall possess flying qualities compatible with the primary student 
training environment. The aircraft shall have levels of safety, redundancy, 
performance, and normal and emergency procedures commensurate with the skill 
levels of students with no prior aviation experience. Therefore, the aircraft shall be 
tolerant of common student errors. Common student errors shall include, as a 
minimum, low airspeed departures, exceeding maximum operating speed by 20 
knots, wrong rudder application during erect spin recovery, and delayed and/or 
misapplied controls during 1) accelerated pitchout stall in the traffic pattern (clean), 
2) nose-low accelerated stall in the traffic pattern (configured), and 3) landing 
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attitude stall (configured). In the following requirements, subjective terms such as 
objectionable, excessive, etc., have been used. Final determination of compliance 
with these requirements shall be made by the government.” 
 
These differences drove separate flight tests after formal certification testing. 
 
As a result of QT&E, the majority of the T-6 performance characteristics were found to be 
satisfactory. This included the flying qualities, avionics, and subsystems. The aircraft was found 
to be easy to fly throughout the range of aerobatics, stalls, spins, low level, and formation flights. 
In general, the aircraft was deemed tolerant to student error. Several shortfalls that were noted as 
requiring a fix or resolution before IOC included: 
 
1.   Potential for significant and costly damage to the engine because of the result of 
student error 
 
2.   Unsuitable performance of the Environmental Control System (ECS) during warm 
weather operations 
 
3.   Performance of the aircraft at higher AOA, both positive and negative, warranting 
further high AOA and post-stall testing 
 
3.3.6      Multi-Service Operational Test and Evaluation (MOT&E) 
 
DoD policy requires that “Systems that multiple services will acquire or use must undergo 
multiservice operational T&E (MOT&E). The designated lead service has primary responsibility 
for the test program and test procedures, with participation from the other services. A service 
with unique requirements does its own planning, testing, and funding for them. Because of 
differences in employment, test results that may be satisfactory for one service may not be for 
another.”61 
 
The resultant aircraft-level MOT&E took place at Randolph AFB from June – November 2000. 
The purpose of MOT&E was to evaluate aircraft safety and suitability, using the ORD as the 
basis. The evaluators included pilots from AFOTEC, Navy Operational Test and Evaluation 
Force  (OPTEVFOR),  AETC,  and  Chief  of  Naval  Air  Training  (CNATRA).  During  the 
evaluation, eight pilots completed 200 sorties and 303 flight hours. The team also performed day 
and night flights out of NAS Corpus Christi to evaluate the aircraft in a Navy environment. 
Various issues hampered the test program. Testing was halted initially because of landing gear 
problems. The maintenance manuals did not provide adequate troubleshooting information, 
increasing repair times. Two major issues identified during MOT&E were the ECS and UHF 
radio. The ECS was not providing the required cooling, and the UHF radio had intermittent loss 
of reception. The test program was halted again in August 2000 following a Class A mishap (see 
Paragraph 3.5.2). 
 
The final MOT&E report stated that the T-6A was operationally effective for use in the joint 
primary training environment but was not operationally suitable to meet the sortie rate 
requirements. It also restricted operations because of problematic ECS and UHF radio 
performance. 
 
 
 
 
61 “Test and Evaluation Trends and Costs for Aircraft and Guided Weapons,” Rand Project Air Force, Bernard Fox, 
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3.4      Production 
 
RAC built a new T-6A production facility in Wichita. Besides the 732 aircraft expected in the 
Government buy, RAC expected to produce a large number of aircraft (over 400) for Foreign 
Military Sales (FMS). 
 
3.4.1      Lots 1 through 8 
 
The contract, which was awarded on February 1, 1996, provided for eight lots of aircraft. Like 
the EMD contract, the production contract was awarded under FAR Part 15 (Contracting by 
Negotiations) and had most of the regulations and reporting requirements of a typical Air Force 
contract. Lot 1 included the development and delivery of an instrumented manufacturing 
development aircraft to  be used  for QT&E. The last  seven lot options were for production 
aircraft. The contract was a fixed price incentive, firm with award fee. The contract was 
definitized in February 1996, effectively capping the prices of the aircraft. This contract strategy 
was used to buy the maximum number of aircraft possible while ramping up the production line 
during this Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) phase. Figure 17 identifies the aircraft quantities 
for each lot. 
 
LOT Number of Aircraft 
1 1 Air Force 
2 2 Air Force 
3 6 Air Force 
4 15 Air Force 
5 22 Air Force 
6 22 Air Force 
7 24 Air Force/8 Navy 
8 30 Air Force/24 Navy 
Figure 17. Production Deliveries62 
 
When manufacturing costs rose and the projected FMS sales did not materialize, aircraft unit 
costs rose from $3.9 million to $4.4 million. RAC initially planned to reduce costs by using a 
one-piece wing box hogged out of a single billet of material instead of a wing box built up by 
hand. Once the program was underway, material costs skyrocketed, forcing RAC back to a built- 
up wing box. Since unit costs were capped under the fixed price contract, RAC was subsidizing 
the $0.5 million cost differential through Lot 8. A Joint Estimating Team (JET) was formed in 
the summer of 2000 to develop methods to reduce costs to both RAC and the Government in the 
out-year lots. The JET made two recommendations to reduce unit cost back to the $3.9 million 
level. First, they recommended changing to FAR Part 12 (Commercial) contract procedures for 
Lots 9 and on. They also recommended that RAC outsource some of its in-house manufacturing. 
The second recommendation would require an initial investment, so Lots 7 and 8 were changed 
to FAR Part 12 procedures, giving RAC early cost relief. 
 
3.4.2      First Flight 
 
First flight of the initial production aircraft occurred on July 15, 1998, at the contractor’s field in 
Wichita. Piloted by experimental test pilot, Mr. Bob Newsom, the turboprop trainer lifted off at 
86 kts and reached an altitude of 13,000 feet. The flight profile was designed to assess basic 
 
62 Contract F33657-94-C-0006, 5 February 1996, Page 45 
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flying qualities; idle power characteristics; stalls; and basic aerobatics, including loops, aileron 
rolls, and barrel rolls. The flight lasted 1.8 hours and included a functional systems check. First 
flight resulted in no major problems and was deemed a success. 
 
3.4.3      Canadian Sales 
 
Canada  also  procured  24  T-6A-1s  commercially  to  support  the  North  Atlantic  Treaty 
Organization (NATO) Flying Training Program. They began taking deliveries on February 29, 
2000. The Canadian T-6A is also used as a primary aircraft trainer leading to subsequent training 
in  the BAE  Systems Hawk  115  jet  trainer.  This  is a  joint  venture of Bombardier  and  the 
Canadian government. Flight training is available to international Air Forces through 
Government-to-Government agreements.63  These commercial sales were strictly between RAC 
and the Canadian government. The SPO did not form an FMS office to support this buy. 
 
3.4.4      Greek Sales 
 
The Hellenic Air Force (HAF) (Greece) bought 45 aircraft commercially for the primary flight 
training program. Deliveries of the first 25 aircraft similar to the Air Force configuration began 
in July 2000. The remaining aircraft include provisions for light armament to be used in the more 
advanced stages of the training syllabus. As with the Canadian buy, the SPO was not directly 
involved with the sales. 
 
3.4.5      Basing Concept 
 
The T-6A would be used for pilot training at numerous locations. Primary training would be 
conducted at NAS Whiting Field (three Squadrons); NAS Corpus Christi (two Squadrons); 
Columbus AFB (one Squadron); Laughlin AFB (one Squadron); Reese AFB (one Squadron); 
Vance AFB (one Squadron); and Moody AFB (one Squadron). Euro-NATO Joint Jet Pilot 
Training would be conducted at Sheppard AFB. T-6A Instructor Pilot Training was conducted at 
Randolph AFB, NAS Corpus Christi, NAS Whiting Field, and NAS Pensacola. 
3.4.6      Delivery of First T-6A to the 12th Flying Training Wing (FTW) 
 
The first T-6A was delivered to the 12 FTW at Randolph AFB on May 23, 2000. This began the 
organic instructor pilot training for the Air Force. The initial group of instructor pilots was 
trained by RAC in Wichita. These instructor pilots would then train future instructor pilots and 
fly newly delivered aircraft before distribution to their training bases. 
 
3.4.7      Druyan Declares Full Rate Production 
 
The Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) for the DoD sent the SAF a letter on 
August 7, 2001, with concerns about beginning student pilot training before they addressed the 
MOT&E issues. He also stressed his concern about entering full rate production before the safety 
and suitability issues were addressed. The Secretary’s response was “Through ongoing and 
planned hardware change, focus on training procedures, and additional testing, we are resolving 
all 15 safety concerns.” He also provided a letter from AFOTEC withdrawing their ECS and 
UHF safety concerns. The DOT&E still released a report that expanded upon his concerns. Other 
than making headlines, the report did not impact the program, and initial student pilot training 
began at Moody AFB in October 2001. 
 
 
 
63 NATO Flight Training Center, http://www.nftc.com/nftc/en/flash/nftc.jsp, 28 July 2009 
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Following Milestone II discussions, the Air Force Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary 
(Acquisition  and  Management),  Ms.  Darlene  Druyan,  authorized  the  air  vehicle  portion  of 
JPATS to enter full rate production on December 3, 2001. 
 
3.4.8      Lots 9 through 13 
 
The JET recommendations included changing to a FAR Part 12 (Commercial) contract for Lots 9 
through 13. This change greatly reduced the required deliverables and Government oversight, 
which resulted in a cost savings. Unfortunately, changing the contract type to save money comes 
at  a  price.  A  huge  number  of  contractor  and  Government  man-hours  were  expended  to 
implement this change. 
 
3.4.9      Deliveries Fall Short 
 
Early in the program, RAC began falling short of scheduled aircraft deliveries mainly because of 
a lack of personnel building the wing. RAC told AETC that it would step up its efforts to regain 
a schedule, but, when deliveries still fell short, AETC asked the SPO for a schedule assessment. 
The SPO’s assessment indicated that it was unlikely that RAC would catch up. The contract 
called for the delivery of 54 aircraft by the end of 2001, and, at the current rate of three aircraft 
per month, they would deliver only 45. The SPO analysis predicted an achievable production rate 
of 4-5 per month, resulting in 49 deliveries. However, RAC needed to deliver 6-7 aircraft per 
month to reach the scheduled delivery of 54. RAC had been improving assembly and delivery 
time from an average of 234 days in 2000 to 105 days in 2001, and the last five aircraft were 
down to 86 days. RAC increased the workforce by 65 percent, added new manufacturing 
processes, and increased overtime hours 30 to 40 percent. They managed to deliver 5-7 aircraft 
per month and deliver the required 54 aircraft by the end of 2001.64 
 
Parts shortages were a continual problem, forcing RAC to send aircraft to the paint facility short 
of parts. The result was that the after-installation required touch-up and rework. This added 6-8 
days to the schedule, and deliveries again fell behind in early 2002. They initially fell short by 
three aircraft and, later, five aircraft by the end of February. They managed to reduce the backlog 
to four aircraft by the end of April, but a shortage of hydraulic parts was a major problem. 
Changes to the production line to install the enhanced ECS also worked against meeting the 
delivery schedule. The company proposed delaying the delivery of 13 aircraft, so they could 
make the ECS changes and get back on schedule. The SPO and AETC agreed with this proposal. 
RAC managed to get the parts shortages under control, which eliminated the need for touch-up 
and rework. They also implemented a new paint system, using appliqués and decals, which 
reduced production delays. Now that RAC was back on schedule, AETC could begin standing up 
the Laughlin AFB Training Squadron.65 T-6A deliveries are listed in Figure 18. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
64 A Training System for the 21st Century: JPATS and the T-6, Richard H Emmons, June 2004, Page 42 
65 Ibid, Page 42 
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Figure 18. T-6 Deliveries 
 
3.5      Fielding and Sustainment 
 
RAC was also responsible for logistics support, including spares provisioning. During original 
spares planning, the Government Auditing Agency recommended structuring a spares part 
program in which the contractor would be responsible for the procurement and management of 
the spares. This was because of the number of design shortfalls requiring a fix. When stable, the 
Government would assume responsibility for the spares. The Program Office implemented the 
recommendation and eventually used the spares savings for other items, such as upgrading the 
cooling capability of the ECS. In early 2008, the Air Force decided that the configuration was 
sufficiently stable to reconsider whether the Air Force should assume the procurement and 
management of the spares. The Program Office conducted a cost analysis that showed a lifetime 
cost of $72 million ($60 million for air vehicle spares and $12.2 million for support equipment 
spares) for the Air Force procurement and management of the spares. The minimum projected 
cost savings to the Air Force was $750 million with a break-even point in 2014. There was also a 
need for an additional $30 million in engine spares. Senior Air Force management liked the 
savings, and, in the spring of 2008, the program received $60 million for the spares with another 
$12.2 million following in the fall of 2008. This covered the costs of all projected air vehicle and 
support equipment spares for the lifetime of the delivered aircraft at the signing of the contract. 
The engine spares still needed to be addressed. The cost savings is predicated on the premise of a 
contractor managing the spares but the Air Force owning the spares. Thus, the Air Force would 
only pay for the services associated with the handling of the spares, i.e., the handling services 
associated with the procurement, shipping, etc. The Navy is responsible for their own spares. 
 
3.5.1      Initial Operational Capability (IOC) 
 
Although aircraft deliveries were on schedule, portions of the GBTS lagged. AETC decided to 
begin joint undergraduate flight training without a fully operational GBTS. The first class (13 
Air Force and two Navy) began training at Moody AFB in October 2001. The final portion of the 
GBTS was tested in March and April 2002 with resulting discrepancies fixed by the first of May. 
Gen Cook, AETC Commander, officially announced IOC on July 12, 2002. 
 
3.5.2      Class A Mishaps 
 
The T-6 Texan II has experienced four Class A mishaps since 2000. In August 2000, one of the 
crew  inadvertently  cut  off  the  engine  during  landing.  A  contributing  factor  was  the  close 
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proximity  of  the  flap  lever  and  the  power  control  lever  cut  off  finger  lift.  The  Accident 
Investigation Board Executive Summary is in Figure 19.66 
 
The second Class A mishap occurred in April 2004. The mishap pilot performed maneuvers 
outside the limits of the aircraft, which resulted in the crash. Both occupants were killed. The 
Executive Summary is in Figure 20.67 
 
The third mishap happened in November 2007. Two T-6s collided while performing training 
sorties. Both aircraft were destroyed, but all four occupants ejected safely. The Executive 
Summary is in Figure 21.68 
 
The fourth mishap was in June 2008. The engine was shut down following uncommanded power 
changes and vibrations. The aircraft was set up for a no-power approach per the manual, but the 
propeller did not feather, causing additional drag, which resulted in failure to reach the runway. 
The Mishap Instructor Pilot contributed to the mishap by not resetting the Propeller System 
Circuit Breaker before in-flight engine shutdown. The Executive Summary is in Figure 22.69 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
66United States Air Force Class A Aerospace Mishaps, http://usaf.aib.law.af.mil/index.html, 14 July 2009 
67 Ibid 
68 Ibid 
69 Ibid 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION 
T-6A;SERIAL NUMBER 95-3008 
THE 559111 FLYING TRAINING SQUADRON 
RANDOLPH AIR  FORCE BASE, TEXAS 
31 AUGUST 2000 
 
On 31 August 2000, at 1632 Central Daylight  Time, a T-6A, SIN 95-3008, crashed 3.5 miles 
south of StinsQP. Municipal  Airport, San Antonio, Texas.  The T-6A Texan II {MA), assigned  to 
the 559'h Flying Training Squadron (FTS), 12111 Flying Training  Wing, Randolph Air Force Base, 
Texas, was on an instructor enhancement  program training mission.  Both the Mishap Instructor 
Pilot (MIP) and the Mishap Pilot (MP) ejected  safely sustaining minor injuries. The MIP  · 
received  cuts and abrasions on his face from ejecting  without his oxygen mask fully connected 
and a broken ankle from his parachute landing fall.  The MP had several shards of canopy 
embedded in his eyes due to ejecting wi t hout his visor down.  The aircraft impacted  in a 
cornfield causing  virtually  no property damage.  The MA was destroyed  upon impact, with loss 
valued at $5,538,549.00. 
 
Shortly before impact, the mishap crew (MC) was flying a Global Positioning System (GPS) 
·approach to Stinson  Municipal Airport, Texas.  As they approached  the final approach  fix, the 
MIP directed  the MP to configure the aircraft.  After lowering the gear, the MP was unable to 
locate the flap lever.  The MIP described the location of the flap lever and then stated he was 
lowering the flaps.  As the MIP lowered the flaps, the crew experienced a total loss of power. 
After one restart attempt, the crew ejected. 
 
Ifind by clear and convincing  evidence the primary cause of the mishap was the MP 
inadvertently placing the power control lever (PCt) to the cut-off position.  1\.s a result, the 
engine lost all power.  All aircraft systen1s functioned as designed  throughout the: entire flight. 
Both pilots testified that the MIP moved the tlaps to "TAKEOFF".  The MP was flying the 
airplane and at the time searching for the flap lever.  He had his hand above and around the PCL. 
According to the Flight Data Recorder, the flap lever was moved from "UP" to "TAKEOFF" 
during the same second or flight the PCL was moved below idle.  Due to the relationship of the 
flap lever and the PCL cutoff finger-lift, it is impossible for one person to do both without 
intentionally trying to do so. 
 
But Jar the fact the MP was u n(amiliar with the T-6A cockpit, he would not have: been 
looking for the flap lever during the approac. 
 
But for the fact that the MP inadvertently placed the power control lever (PCL) to the: cut-off 
position, the engine would not have lost power. 
 
Under 10 U.S.C. 2254(d) aoy opinion of the accident investigators as to the cause of, or tbe 
factors contributing to, the accident set forth  in the accident investigation report may not 
be considered as evidence in any civil or criminal proceeding arising from an  aircn ft 
accident,  nor  may such  information be considered an  admission of liability by the United 
States  or by any  person  referred to in those conclusions or statements. 
 
 
 
·T-6A TEXAN  II, SIN  95-3008, 3 l A ugust 2000 
Execut ive Summ ary, Page  I of I 
 
 
 
 
Figure 19. Accident Investigation,  August 2000 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AIRCRAFT 
ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION T-6A, 
SERIAL NUMBER 99-3553 
THE 479th FLYING TRAINING GROUP, 3d FLYING TRAINING SQUADRON 
MOODY AIR FORCE BASE, GEORGIA 
 
3 APRIL 2004 
 
On 3 April2004, at 0916 Eastern Standard Time (EST), a T-6A, SIN 99-3553 crashed 
1540 feet south of runway 27 at Savannah Hilton-Head International Airport, Savannah., 
Georgia.  The mishap aircraft (MA), a T-6A Texan II, assigned to the 
3d Flying Training Squadron (3 FTS), 479th Flying Training Group (479 FTG), Moody 
Air Force Base, Georgia, was on a continuation training (CT) cross country mission. The 
Mishap crew (MC), consisting of Mishap Pilot 1 (MPl) and Mishap Pilot 2 (MP2), were 
assigned to the 39th Flying Training Squadron (39 FTS) and were fatally injured in the 
mishap. MPl ejected after the MA was out of the survivable ejection envelope. The 
aircraft impacted the ground within the Savannah Hilton-Head International Airport 
causing minimal property damage. The MA was destroyed with the loss valued at 
$4,200,000. 
 
The MC had been cleared for takeoff and one left closed traffic pattern before departing 
under Visual Flight Rules (VFR) to the west.  After takeoff, the MC retracted the landing 
gear and flaps, leveled off at 30 feet above the runway, accelerated to 168 knots, pitched 
up 37 degrees nose high (3.6 times the gravitational force (Gs)  ) climbing to an altitude 
uf 530 feet while simultaneously rolling into 131 degrees of left bank (nearly inverted). 
MPl ejected at an altitude of 337 feet above ground level (AGL), three seconds prior to 
the MA impacting the ground in a 45 degree nose down attitude. 
 
Clear and convincing evidence suggests the cause of this fatal aircraft mishap was pilot 
error. For unknown reasons, the pilot flying the MA performed a closed pattern exceeding 
the maximum bank angle of90 degrees and allowed his airspeed to decrease to 
131 knots, below the minimum airspeed of 140 knots as directed in Air Force Manual11- 
248. The 37 degree 3.6 G pitch up coupled with the high bank angle and slow airspeed 
caused the MA to stall and roll further towards inverted flight. The MC made no attempt 
to apply proper stall recovery procedures. As a result, the MA was nearly inverted at a 
much lower than normal altitude and was too low for safe ejection.  Aircraft engine and 
flight control systems were operating normally when the aircraft crashed. 
 
Under 10 U.S.C. 2254(d), any opinion of the accident investigators as to the cause of, or the 
factors contributing to, the accident set forth  in the accident investigation report may not be 
considered as evidence in any civil or criminal proceeding arising from an aircraft accident, 
nor may such information be considered an  admission  of liability by the United States or by 
any  person  referred to in those conclusions or statements. 
 
T-6A Texan II, SIN 99-3553, 3 April2004 
Executive Summary, Page  I  of I 
 
 
 
 
Figure 20. Accident Investig ation, April 2004 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BOARD T-6A, 01-3613/00-3579 
14TI:I FLYING TRAINING WING, 4lsr FLY1NG TRAINING SQUADRON 
COLUMBUS AIR FORCE BASE, MISSISSIPPI 
28 NOVEMBER 2007 
 
On 28 November2007, at 12:38 Central Standard Time (CST), two T-6As, tail numbers 01-3613 
(MA l ) and 00-3579 (MA2), operating out of the 141  Flying Training Wing, 41"Flying Training 
Squadron, Columbus Air Force Base (AFB), Mississippi, coll-ided inmid-air.  The collision 
occurred three miles northeast of Gunshy Auxiliary Airfield, which is 40 miles south of Columbus 
AFB. Both mishap aircraft (MA) were conducting flying training on approved Air Education and 
Training Command syllabus sorties with a mishap student pilot (MSP) in the front seat and a 
mishap instructor pilot (MIP) in the backseat. The collision occurred whil'e both MA were 
operating under Visual Flight Rules, in Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC), in Class D 
airspace. After the mid-air collision, both MA were determined to be unflyable by their 
respective MIPs, and all four crew members safely ejected. They were all treated at Columbus 
AFB Medical Clinicand released the same day.  Both MA were completely destroyed at a total 
loss of$10,010,740.08. The collision resulted in debris fi.elds on three separate patc.els of 
uninhabited private property. To date, there are no known claims for damage to any of the 
properties. Wrecka.ge recovery and environmental remediation is forecasted to cost under 
$40,000. 
 
Just prior to the collision, M.Al approached the Gunsby VFR entry point and executed a pre- 
planned breakout maneuver with a right climbing turn from 1300 to 2300 feet Mean Sea Level 
(MSL). During the maneuver, MSP J  initially turned the wrong direction, failed to make an 
advisory radio call, and began an aggressive climb that would overshoot the desired altitude. 
Correcting these three simultaneous errors resu1ted in tusk saturation to the point where MSPl 
and MIPJ did not adequately clear their flightpath during their climbing turn.  MAl had no 
awareness of any other aircraft operating 'in the pattern until they impacted MA2. 
 
MA2 was previousl y established in the Gunshypattern and also operating in the vicinity ofthe 
VFR entry point at 2.300 feet MSL after initiating a breakout from the perch point. They had 
radio Situational Awareness ofMAl enteringtlte pattern, but had never acquired them visually. 
MA2 did not hear or process MA1'slate "VFR entry, breaking out''call.  At impact, MA2 was 
flying straight and level, heading 040• with MIP2 at the controls instructing MSP2. 
 
Clear and convincing evidence suggests that the cause of this aircraft mishap was pilot e.rror, 
specifically, failure of the M[l's and MSPs to adequately clear their tlightpaths in accordance 
with Air Force Manual ll-248. 
 
 
 
 
Under 10 U.S.C. 2254(d) any opinion of the accident investigaton as to the cause of, or the 
factors contributing to,the accident set forth in the accident investig2tion report may not be 
considered as evidence in any civil or criminal proceeding arising from an aircraft accident, nor 
may such informafion be considered an admission of liability of the United States or by an)' 
person referred to in those conclusions or statements. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 21. Accident Investigation,  November 2007 
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AIRCRAIT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BOARD REPORT 
T-6A, S/N 06-3851 
VANCE AIR  FORCE BASE, OKLAHOMA 
04JUN 08 
 
EXECUTIVE SUMI\'IARY 
 
On  4 June 2008,  at  I 016 local  time, the Mishap Aircraft  (MA), a T-6A, serial  number 06-3851, 
sustained damage as the Mishap Instructor Pilot (MIP) attempted a n engine  out  Forced  Landing 
(FL)  approach to Vance  Air  Force  Base  (AFB),  Oklahoma. The  Mishap Student Pilot  (MSP) 
suffered minor  injuries.  The  MA,  MIP, and  MSP  were  assigned to  the 71 st  Flying  Training 
Wing  at  Vance AFB.    The  MIP  and  MSP  were  flying  a contact training mission designed to 
continue the MSP's preparation for an initial solo flight in the T•6.  The MA sustained damage to 
the Left wing,  landing gear, and propeller estimated at 5831,631.00. The MA impacted a taxiway 
short  of  the  intended  landing runway at  Vance AFB.  This caused  incidental damage  to  the 
taxiway, and the grass infield  area to its west, but no damage to private property or structures. 
 
During initial  departure from  Vance  AFB, approximately 85 seconds after   takeoff, the  MA 
experienced  an   uncommanded  power   change.    The   MIP   iu.itiattid  a  return   to  base   via  u 
Precautionary Emergency Landing.   During  the retum,  the MA experienced an additional 
uncommauded power change event  accompanied by engine  vibrations and  a "CHIP" warning 
light,  indicating possible metal  contamination in  the  MA's engine  oil  supply.  The  MIP  shut 
down  the MA's engine after reaching Vance AFB airspace and once established at an appropriate 
al titude  and airspeed for the FL approach. During the MA's FL approach, the propeller did not 
move  to  the  commanded streamlined "feathered" position,  resulting in  increased drag  and  an 
increased   aircraft descent rate.   As a  result, the  MA  failed   to  reaclt  the  runwaY.    The  MA 
il11pacted Vance AFB Taxiway B, short  of Runway 17L, damaging the aircraft.  After  impact, the 
MA  continued  to  slide   into   the  grass   infield  area   west   of  Taxiway  B  and   came  to  rest 
approximately 585 feet from its original  impact point. 
 
The  Accident Investigation Board  President determined by  clear  and  convincing evidence the 
plimary cause  of the mishap  was due  to the MA's propeller not  feathering in a timely  manner. 
This led to an increase in aerodynamic drag  and an excessive descent  rate during the MA's FL 
attempt, which   caused   the  MA  to  impact  short   of  the  runway and  sustain damage.    Two 
substantial factors contributed to this mishap. The first factor  was the MA experiencing multiple 
Propelfer Sleeve Touchdown (PSTD) events.   These PSTDs led  to  the MA  suffering an 
uncommanded power change on departure which  ultimately prompted the MIP  to shut  dow n the 
MA's engine  while airborne. The second  factor was the MlP  not completing the Uncommanded 
Power    Changes/Loss   of    Power!Uncommanded   Propeller     Feather    checklist   procedures. 
Specifically, the  MIP  did  not  reset  the Propeller System Circuit Breaker  prior  to  the  in-flight 
engine shutdown which contributed to the MA's propeller not feathering in a timely  manner. 
 
Under 10 U.S.C. § 2254(d) any opinion of the accident investigators as to the cause of, or the factors 
contributing to,  the accident set  forth in  the accid nl investigation  report ntay  not be considered  as 
evidence in nny civil  or criminal  proceeding arising from the accident, nor may sucl.1  informat ion be 
considered an admission of liability of the United States or by any person referred to in those conclusions 
or statements. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 22. Accident Investigation, June 2008 
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3.5.3      Requirements Management 
 
The T-6A program was now on track, systematically standing up Training Squadrons at the 
various bases. As the JPATS was fielded, new requirements began to surface. A program is 
naturally more complex when it involves multiple Services. This is particularly true when 
establishing new requirements, since the requirements must first be coordinated with each of the 
users (i.e., Services). To address this concern, AETC implemented a disciplined process in 
calendar year (CY)02 called the Joint Priority List (JPL). The purpose of the JPL is to give both 
the   Air   Force   and   Navy   the   capability   to   provide   the   Program   Office   with   user 
direction/guidance for the project priority and funding priority. With this process, it takes a new 
requirement typically 4-6 months to become listed on the JPL with a new JPL being released 
every six months. Usually, a requirement can wait for the next update, because it takes time to 
identify the details of the change with engineering. Typically, there are 22-46 requirements on 
the JPL at any given moment. Whenever a new JPL is sent to the Program Office, it is 
accompanied by a letter stating that this is the new JPL and that the Program Office should 
reprioritize their implementation according to the new priority. AETC has found that the process 
works well, and other Commands are now implementing the JPL. Below is a summary of the 
process. 
 
“JPATS Joint Priority List (JPL) 
 
PURPOSE:  USAF  and  USN  will  bi-annually  provide  the  337  AESG  with  user-direction/ 
guidance for JPATS project and funding priority 
 
PREPARATION: 
 
1.   Prior to the User’s JPL Meeting, AETC/A5RU and CNATRA N38 will review the current 
JPL within each service JPATS functional areas 
 
2.   664AESS will forward program office input, to  include Hawker Beechcraft  Corporation 
(HBC) recommendations, to AETC/A5RU and CNATRA N38 for consideration during each 
service’s pre-meetings, as well as the User’s JPL Meeting 
 
USER’s JPL Meeting: 
 
1.   The User’s JPL Meeting will be held twice a year, early enough to provide guidance at the 
next PMR (NLT Mar/Sep) 
2.   Venue  for  the  User’s  JPL  Meeting  normally  is  held  at  Randolph  AFB  (hosted  by 
AETC/A5RU) but can alternate to NAS Corpus Christi (hosted by CNATRA N38) 
A.  Required participants are: 
-   AETC/A5RU (Co-Chair) Voting Member 
-   CNATRA/N38 (Co-Chair) Voting Member 
-   CNATRA/N42 
-   AETC/A4MAU 
-   AETC/A3FI 
-   19AF/DOU 
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-   664AESS/PM 
-   664AESS/FM 
B.  Other attendees may be invited (i.e. AETC/CNATRA Safety, Stan/EVAL, GBTS, 664 
AESS/EN/PK/LG 
3.   All attendees must be prepared to review and discuss JPL issues such as deletions, and re- 
prioritization. Documented justification (normally accomplished via AF Form 1067) is 
required  for  any  new  projects/issues  introduced  at  the  User’s  JPL  Meeting.  This  User 
meeting will consolidate/prioritize all inputs with representatives from CNATRA, AESS, and 
AETC into a single JPL. CNATRA and AETC will coordinate the new JPL at the 3-digit 
level at HQ AETC and CNATRA N3 
 
ROE: 
 
1.   When either a project is cut-in to production or a retrofit begins, Priority 0 is assigned to the 
project/issue 
 
-   All Priority 0 projects will be listed at the top of the JPL and are must pay budget 
items 
 
2.   When both production cut-in and retrofit have begun, the project moves to Monitor (M) 
status 
 
3.   If a project is cut into production and retrofit is by attrition, then the project moves to 
Completed/Fielded/Deleted (CFD) Tab 
 
4.   Projects that do not modify the aircraft (such as ELMP and TOLD) will move to Priority 0, 
M, or CFD as determined by JPL committee 
 
5.   CLS/Sustainment and GBTS Projects are tracked on separate TABS 
 
6.   A project is moved to CFD status when: 
 
-   Production cut-in and retrofit actions are complete (Exception see #3 of ROE) 
 
-   A requirement is deleted by AETC and CNATRA 
 
-   Upon completion of contractual effort (i.e. CLS/Sustainment and GBTS projects) 
 
7.    The following colors identify changes to the JPL: 
 
- New requirements or name change are identified in RED 
- Funded projects are identified in GREEN”70 
 
3.5.4      Mission Capable Rates 
 
A JPATS system-level MOT&E was conducted at Moody AFB and completed on January 30, 
2003. The system-level evaluation concluded that JPATS effectively trained students that were 
prepared for their solo flight and that the students performed better on instrument flights. The 
evaluation rated the T-6A safe and suitable following modifications to fix the ECS and UHF 
radio issues. However, the required joint primary pilot training sortie generation rate was rated 
unsuitable. A mission capable rate of 90 percent was reached, which is less than the 91 percent 
 
 
 
70 JPATS Joint Priority List (JPL), AETC/A5RU, 19 June 2009 
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requirement  in  the  ORD.  The  mission  reliability  rate  was  96.6  percent  versus  the  ORD 
requirement of 98.5 percent. 
 
3.6      Follow-on Operational Test and Evaluation (FOT&E) 
 
An FOT&E was accomplished from May 2003 through November 2004 to evaluate issues that 
the MOT&E could not address because of GBTS problems at the time. The FOT&E performed a 
Navy specific evaluation of the T-6A at NAS Pensacola, a suitability evaluation of the T-6A at 
Laughlin AFB, and a GBTS evaluation at Laughlin AFB and NAS Corpus Christi. 
 
The T-6A was evaluated, performing Navy specific maneuvers, patterns, and environments. In 
reality, the Navy training environment was very constrained in terms of runway length and 
airspace as compared to the Air Force. Likewise, the evaluation included the effects of salt air 
and wash rate, since the Navy training typically occurred near the ocean. The conclusion of the 
FOT&E was that JPATS would support the needs of Joint Primary Pilot Training, Undergraduate 
Naval Pilot Training, Specialized Undergraduate Pilot Training, Joint Undergraduate Navigator 
Training, Joint Navigator/Naval Flight Officer Training, and Euro-NATO Joint Jet Pilot 
Training. 
 
3.7      Nunn-McCurdy Breach 
 
The Nunn-McCurdy Amendment was first introduced in the 1982 Defense Authorization Act 
and was made permanent in 1983. The amendment was designed to curtail cost growth in United 
States military weapon procurements. 
 
Appendix 3 of this case study contains a copy of the amendment. Simply speaking, the 
amendment requires that the Pentagon notify Congress when cost growth on a major acquisition 
program reaches 15 percent. If the cost growth reaches 25 percent, the Pentagon must recertify 
the program based on the following criteria: 
 
1.  The system is essential to national security. 
 
2.  There  are  no  alternatives  to  the  system  that  will  provide  equal  or  greater  military 
capability at less cost. 
 
3.  New estimates of total program unit cost or procurement unit cost are reasonable. 
 
4.  Management structure for the system is adequate to manage and control the total program 
acquisition unit cost or procurement unit cost. 
 
Rarely is a program cancelled under this law. However, the recertification results in numerous 
program  improvements,  and  Congress  typically  accepts  the  Secretary  of  Defense’s 
recertification. 
 
The Defense Authorization Act of 2006 revised the Nunn-McCurdy Amendment and added 
thresholds for the original program baseline. Previously, programs would rebaseline, which 
avoided breaching the Nunn-McCurdy Amendment criteria, allowing cost growth to go 
unreported.   Original  program  baseline  cost   growth  exceeding  30  percent   results   in  a 
“Significant” breach, and exceeding 50 percent results in a “Critical” breach. Many programs, 
including  the  JPATS  T-6A,  found  themselves  breaching  the  amendment  criteria  based  on 
original program baseline cost growth. 
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The JPATS T-6A was one of seven programs during that period that had a critical breach to their 
original program baseline cost following revisions to the Nunn-McCurdy Amendment.71 A DoD 
review72 concluded that the cost growth of just over 50 percent was attributed to changes in 
Government requirements. The program was recertified without restructuring with the following 
ADM direction: 
 
“The Air Force and Navy shall fully fund the certified JPATS program in accordance 
with the Program Office cost estimate. The Air Force, as Executive Agent, must submit a 
Change  Proposal  to  reflect  a  total  program  cost  of  $5.137  billion,  an  Average 
Procurement Unit Cost of $6.7 million, and a total quantity of 767 aircraft.”73 
 
3.8      Lots 14 through 20 
 
The sole source contract for Lots 14 through 20 was signed in late 2007. The period of 
performance (PoP) for this contract is FY07 to FY16 with a ceiling cost of $3 billion. Lot 14 and 
a portion of Lot 15 will be Air Force aircraft, and the remainder will be delivered to the Navy. 
Contrary to the JET recommendations, the contract type reverted to a FAR Part 15 contract with 
some streamlining. Again, change is not free. The contractor estimates that changing the contract 
type for Lots 9 through 13 and back again for Lots 14 through 20 required tens of thousands of 
hours. 
 
3.9      Future of the T-6 
 
The Air Force took the initial deliveries of the T-6A while the Navy planned to take deliveries in 
the outer years. While the Air Force was taking deliveries of T-6As, the Navy decided to pursue 
a  significantly  upgraded  version,  the  T-6B.  They  plan  to  procure  260  T-6B  aircraft  to 
compliment the 79 T-6A aircraft they are currently operating. The T-6B features open- 
architecture and advanced avionics suite, including a Heads-Up Display (HUD). It reflects the 
systems and capabilities of current frontline aircraft, which enables the training of complex 
advanced systems and information management skills. The Operational Flight Program (OFP) in 
the T-6B includes a weapon delivery training capability. 
 
During the Farnborough Air Show in 2006, RAC announced plans to build the AT-6B, which is 
a light attack version of the T-6B for the centric battlefield. The multi-role AT-6 will be capable 
of performing missions, including net-centric Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 
(ISR), with the ability for precise geo-registration, streaming video, and datalinks; light attack, 
including Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR), close air support, forward air control, and convoy 
escort; homeland defense (border security), port security, and counter-narcotics operations; and 
civil missions, such as disaster area reconnaissance, search and rescue, and firefighting. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
71 Testimony of John J. Young, Undersecretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics), Before the 
Senate Committee on Armed Services, 3 June 2008, Page 16 
72 DoD hits Lockheed missile program on performance concerns, MarketWatch, http://www.marketwatch.com/ 
news/story/dod-hits-lockheed-missile-program/story.aspx?guid={3D62C654-7AE6-47BA-8C53-F6B47C3A19BD}, 
6 June 2007 
73 “Acquisition Chief Directs Program Updates,” Forecast International, 18 September 2007 
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Iraq has been interested in the T-6 platform. They have requested 20 T-6As and 36 AT-6Bs for 
training and counter-insurgency. As of June 2009, this has changed to 15 T-6As but no AT-6Bs 
yet. 74 
 
T-6B’s export version is called the T-6C, which is an upgraded aircraft with a hardpoint wing. 
Morocco is the lead customer for the T-6C and has requested 24 aircraft. The hardpoint wing 
provides the capability to carry external fuel tanks, practice bombs, weaponry, etc. The 
Moroccan’s plan is to use the hardpoints for fuel tanks. 75 
 
Israel has requested the procurement of 25 T-6A Texan II trainer aircraft to replace its current 
fleet of Zukit trainers. 76 They took delivery of their first aircraft in early 2009. 
 
Although FMS have been slow to materialize, some Government personnel believe there will be 
many foreign sales. They believe that the foreign governments have been waiting for the system 
to mature under United States Government funding before proceeding with their buys. 
 
4.   SUMMARY 
In the mid-1980s, the Air Force realized that their current flight training resources were rapidly 
approaching  obsolescence.  As  a  result,  they published  a  Trainer  Master  Plan  in  1988  that 
required  three  new  trainers:  a  subsonic,  entry  level  (i.e.,  primary)  trainer  to  serve  as  a 
replacement for the T-37; a supersonic, fighter-bomber trainer to serve as a replacement for the 
T-38; and a new airlift and tanker trainer. Following a review of the Trainer Master Plan, 
Congress directed DoD to submit a report containing plans for both Air Force and Navy training. 
The Armed Services Committees wanted a combined DoD plan that would allow the Air Force 
and Navy to procure similar training aircraft to minimize costs. The Air Force was directed to 
take the lead. 
 
A Trainer Summit was held at Randolph AFB in October 1991. Both the Air Force and Navy 
laid out training plans that funneled the pilots from the primary training program to various 
specialized undergraduate pilot programs. At the conclusion of the summit, both the Air Force 
and Navy agreed with joint planning and approved release of the JSORD. 
 
The Milestone 0/I review was held on January 19, 1993. The resulting JPATS ADM required 
that “the source selection criteria must clearly favor proposals involving the lowest development 
risk and the lowest total system cost to the Government.”77 
 
The DAB met in May 1993 and called for the acquisition of a non-developmental aircraft. It also 
specified a two-contract approach in which the Government would first select the airframe 
contractor and then the GBTS contractor. The airframe contractor would have total system 
performance responsibility. In March 1994, the Assistant SAF for Acquisition held a review and 
slightly changed the strategy to require the prime contractor to  select the GBTS contractor 
 
 
 
74“U.S. Air Force AIM Points: BLOG: Hawker Beechcraft and the COIN of the Realm,” http://aimpoints.hq.af.mil/ 
display.cfm?id=34198, 18 June 2009 
75“Morocco’s Air Force Reloads,” Defense Daily, http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/moroccos-air-force- 
reloads-04469/, 19 Dec 2007 
76 “Israel Requests Delivery of 25 U.S. T-6A Texan II Trainers,” http://www.defense-update.com/newscast/ 0608/ 
news/news1006_texan_il.htm, 28 July 2009 
77 “A Case Study: Acquisition Reform and the Joint Primary Training Aircraft System (JPATS),” Kenneth W. 
McKinley, 18 June 2000, Page 24 
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instead  of  the  Government.  The  Defense  Acquisition  Executive  concurred  and  signed  the 
Acquisition Strategy Report on May 17, 1994. 
 
The JPATS T-6 program was at the convergence of several initiatives constituting the “Perfect 
Storm” of acquisition reform. As it began, acquisition reform initiatives/laws were being 
aggressively established to reduce costs, a new administration that heavily pushed acquisition 
reform during the elections had just entered office, and AETC was looking for an off-the-shelf 
trainer. DoD developed DAPPs “to demonstrate new and innovative approaches in the use of 
commercial practices and the acquisition of commercial products.”78  Mr. Deutch, USD at that 
time, formally designated the JPATS program as a DAPP. 
 
Source selection was a “best value” competitive source selection in which development risk and 
total system life-cycle cost was determined through proposal evaluation. Seven contractors 
participated, and the source selection included a Flight Evaluation. Dr. Widnall, then SAF, 
announced the selection of Beech Aircraft Corporation as the prime contractor on June 22, 1995. 
The program called for 711 aircraft, 372 for the Air Force and 339 for the Navy, at a total cost of 
$7 billion. 
 
The EMD contract was a Fixed Price Incentive Firm with an Award Fee. The initial contract was 
awarded under FAR Part 15 (Contracting by Negotiations) and, thus, had most of the regulations 
and reporting requirements of a typical Air Force development contract. Being a DAPP, JPATS 
did get some statutory and regulatory relief. 
 
The T-6 design evolved from the Beech Mk II Turboprop, which was a derivative of the Pilatus 
PC-9. The Pilatus PC-9 was one of the aircraft that AETC included in their early fact-finding 
trips to Europe. When AETC started the fact-finding trips, it was with the understanding that the 
acquisition would be off-the-shelf. They actually tried to keep the acquisition as close to an off- 
the-shelf buy as possible and believed that major design changes would not be required. The first 
few fact-finding trips were oriented to help AETC understand what was available in the market, 
so they could write the requirements for the off-the-shelf acquisition realistically. Eventually, 
AETC realized that a pure off-the-shelf procurement was not realistic and that changes would be 
necessary to missionize the aircraft. This was because of the differences between the commercial 
and military missions, usage, and specification requirements. 
 
The T-6 aircraft was FAA-certified according to the EMD contract. The aircraft underwent an 
integrated QT&E program whose objectives were military qualification and FAA certification. 
There was a subsequent MOT&E that evaluated safety and suitability using the JSORD as the 
basis. 
 
The type of production contracts varied  over time.  Like the EMD contract, the production 
contract for Lots 1 through 8 was procured under FAR Part 15. Lots 9 through 13 were procured 
under FAR Part 12 (Commercial). This change greatly reduced the required deliverables and 
Government oversight, which resulted in a cost savings. Procurement of Lots 14 through 20 
reverted back to FAR Part 15 with some streamlining. 
 
AETC began joint undergraduate flight training at Moody AFB in October 2001. Gen Cook, 
AETC Commander, officially announced IOC on July 12, 2002. 
 
 
78 A Case Study: Acquisition Reform and the Joint Primary Aircraft Training System (JPATS) Program, Kenneth 
W. McKinley, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, June 2000, Page 23 
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The T-6 has a very stellar safety record with only four Class A mishaps, all of which have been 
attributed to pilot error. The mission capable and mission reliability rates fall just short of the 
JSORD requirements but are still very good. The T-6 has a mission capable rate of 90 percent 
(versus 91 percent required by the JSORD) and a mission reliability rate of 96.6 percent (versus 
98.5 percent required by the JSORD). 
 
Since JPATS is a joint Service program with each Service having its own priorities, requirements 
management has been challenging. As a result, AETC implemented a disciplined process in 2002 
called the JPL. The purpose of the JPL is to give both the Air Force and Navy the capability to 
provide the Program Office with user direction for the project priority and funding. The process 
works well, and other Commands are now implementing the JPL. 
 
Because of the success of the JPATS program, sales to other countries continue to increase. 
Canada and Greece have already bought T-6s, Israel has requested a sale, and Iraq has shown 
interest. An advanced avionics version, the T-6B, is being developed for the Navy, and Morocco 
is the lead customer for the T-6C, which will be an upgraded aircraft with hard points in the 
wing. During the Farnborough Air Show in 2006, Hawker Beechcraft (formerly Beech Aircraft 
Corporation) announced plans to build the AT-6B, which is a light attack version of the T-6B. 
With all of these sales either in work or under consideration, the T-6 aircraft should remain as the 
premier primary trainer for years to come. 
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A.1 Bill Kinzig 
 
 
Appendix A. AUTHORS’ BIOGRAPHIES 
Bill Kinzig joined MacAulay-Brown, Inc. (MacB), as a Senior Systems Engineer in 2006, 
providing flight systems and systems engineering support to Government and industry clients. 
He has over 38 years of leadership and management experience in acquisition and sustainment of 
Air Force weapon systems. While working at MacB, he has conducted several research studies 
for the KC-X Program Office; led an E-10 airworthiness certification effort for the Electronic 
Systems Center (ESC) at Hanscom Air Force Base (AFB), Massachusetts; consulted with ESC 
on developing an airworthiness certification approach for the E-8; and rewrote the Aeronautical 
Systems Center (ASC) Guidance Document for Systems Engineering Plans (SEPs) at Wright- 
Patterson AFB (WPAFB), Ohio. 
 
Before his employment at MacB, Mr. Kinzig spent 35 years at ASC/EN, working aircraft 
acquisition. He began his career in the Subsystems Branch, supporting a myriad of aircraft, such 
as the E-3, F-4, A-7K, F-16, B-2, and KC-10. He expanded his responsibilities while working on 
the F-22, eventually leading the Aircraft Systems Integrated Product Team (IPT). From there, he 
was  assigned  as  Technical  Advisor  for  Air  Vehicle  Subsystems  and  ended  his  career  as 
Technical Director for Flight Systems Engineering. While serving as Technical Director, he was 
a Senior Member of the Airworthiness Control Board, Senior Member of the Air Force Fleet 
Viability Board, and Senior Air Force Representative to the biyearly Airworthiness Summits. 
 
Mr. Kinzig earned a B.S. in Mechanical Engineering from the University of Dayton in 1970 and 
an M.S. in Mechanical Engineering from the University of Dayton in 1978. 
 
A.2 Dave Bailey 
 
Dave Bailey joined MacB as a Senior Systems Engineer in November 2007. He has provided 
Flight Systems and Systems Engineering support to the Wide-Body Airborne Sensor Platform 
(WASP) for the Raytheon Corporation. He has also supported ASC/EN, reviewing Unmanned 
Air Vehicle (UAV) airworthiness requirements as compared with proposed Standardization 
Agreement (STANAG) UAV airworthiness requirements. 
 
Before MacB, Mr. Bailey spent 31 years in ASC/EN, working weapon systems acquisition and 
sustainment. Early in his career, he worked in the Subsystems Branch as an Environmental 
Control Systems and Thermal Engineer. There, he supported the B-52, Air Launched Cruise 
Missile (ALCM), B-1, and Advanced Cruise Missile (ACM). He later provided subsystems, 
flight systems, and systems engineering support as a member of various program offices, 
including the B-2, ACM, Global Hawk, and DarkStar. He closed out his career with the Federal 
Government as the Chief Systems Engineer of the F-117, providing sustainment support and 
retiring the weapon system. 
 
Mr. Bailey earned a B.S. in Aerospace Engineering from The Pennsylvania State University in 
1976 and an M.S. in Aerospace Engineering from the University of Dayton in 1981. 
T-6A Texan II Engineering Case Study 
 
Page - 69 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix B. ACRONYMS 
ACC Air Combat Command 
ACM Advanced Cruise Missile 
ACO Aircraft Certification Office 
ADM Acquisition Decision Memorandum 
 
AESS Aeronautical Systems Squadron 
 
AETC Air Education and Training Command 
 
AFB Air Force Base 
 
AFCSE Air Force Center for Systems Engineering 
 
AFIT Air Force Institute of Technology 
 
AFMC Air Force Materiel Command 
 
AFOTEC Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center 
 
ALCM Air Launched Cruise Missile 
 
AMC Air Mobility Command 
 
AOA Angle of Attack 
 
ASC Aeronautical Systems Center 
 
ASIP Aircraft Structural Integrity Program 
 
ATC Air Training Command 
 
BFTS Bomber-Fighter Training System 
 
CCP Contract Change Proposal 
 
CDR Critical Design Review 
 
CDRL Contract Data Requirements List 
CLS Contractor Logistics Support 
CNATRA Chief of Naval Air Training 
CNO Chief of Naval Operations 
 
COMBS Contractor Operated and Maintained Base Supply 
 
CONOPS Concept of Operations 
 
CSAF Chief of Staff of the Air Force 
 
CSAR Combat Search and Rescue 
 
CY Calendar Year 
 
DAB Defense Acquisition Board 
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DADTA Durability and Damage Tolerance Analysis 
 
DAL Data Accession List 
 
DAPP Defense Acquisition Pilot Program 
 
DAU Defense Acquisition University 
 
DFARS Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement 
 
DoD Department of Defense 
 
DoDAF DoD Architectural Framework 
 
DOT&E Director of Operational Test and Evaluation 
 
DUSD(AR) Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Reform 
 
ECP Engineering Change Proposal 
ECS Environmental Control System 
EIA Electronics Industrial Association 
EMD Engineering and Manufacturing Development 
 
ENSIP Engine Structural Integrity Program 
 
ESC Electronic Systems Center 
 
EVMS Earned Value Management System 
FAA Federal Aviation Administration 
FAR Federal Acquisition Regulation 
FASA Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act 
 
FCA Functional Configuration Audit 
 
FMS Foreign Military Sales 
 
FOC Full Operational Capability 
FOD Foreign Object Damage 
FOT&E Follow-on Test and Evaluation 
FRR Flight Readiness Review 
FTW Flying Training Wing 
 
FY Fiscal Year 
 
GBTS Ground Based Training System 
 
GPS Global Positioning System 
 
HAF Hellenic Air Force 
 
HQ Headquarters 
 
HUD Heads-Up Display 
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ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile 
 
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
 
IFF Identification, Friend or Foe 
 
IITRI Illinois Institute of Technology Research Institute 
 
IMP Integrated Master Plan 
 
INCOSE International Council on Systems Engineering 
 
IOC Initial Operational Capability 
 
IPT Integrated Product Team 
 
ISR Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 
 
IT Information Technology 
ITT Integrated Test Team 
JET Joint Estimating Team 
JPATS Joint Primary Aircraft Training System 
 
JPL Joint Priority List 
 
JSON Joint Statement of Operational Need 
 
JSORD Joint System Operational Requirements Document 
 
KTAS Knots True Air Speed 
 
LRIP Low Rate Initial Production 
MAC Military Airlift Command 
MacB MacAulay-Brown, Inc. 
MAJCOM Major Command 
MCO Military Certification Office 
 
MIL-HDBK Military Handbook 
 
MOA Memorandum of Agreement 
MOE Measure of Effectiveness 
MOP Measure of Performance 
MOT&E Multi-Service Operational Test and Evaluation 
 
MOU Memorandum of Understanding 
 
MSL Mean Sea Level 
 
NAS Naval Air Station 
 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
 
OFP Operational Flight Program 
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OPTEVFOR Operational Test and Evaluation Force 
ORD Operational Requirements Document 
OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense 
PATS Primary Aircraft Training System 
PCA Physical Configuration Audit 
PDR Preliminary Design Review 
PFRR Planning for Rate Review 
PIPFS Prime Item Product Function Specification 
 
PMD Program Management Directive 
 
POC Point of Contact 
 
PoP Period of Performance 
 
QT&E Qualification Test and Evaluation 
 
RAA Required Assets Available 
RAC Raytheon Aircraft Company 
RFP Request for Proposals 
S/N Serial Number 
 
SAC Strategic Air Command 
SAF Secretary of the Air Force 
SAR Selected Acquisition Report 
SECDEF Secretary of Defense 
SEP Systems Engineering Plan 
 
SLEP Structural Life Extension Program 
 
SME Subject Matter Expert 
SON Statement of Need 
SoS System-of-Systems 
SOW Statement of Work 
SPO System Program Office 
 
SRD System Requirements Document 
 
SRR Site Readiness Review 
STANAG Standardization Agreement 
TAC Tactical Air Command 
TACC Tailored Airworthiness Certification Criteria 
T-6A Texan II Engineering Case Study 
 
Page - 73 
 
 
 
TBD To Be Determined 
 
TBMCS Theater Battle Management Core System 
 
TCDS Type Certificate Data Sheet 
 
TIMS Training Integration Management System 
TOR Tentative Operational Requirements 
TTTS Tanker-Transport Training System 
TW Test Wing 
 
UAV Unmanned Air Vehicle 
 
USD(A&T) Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology 
USD(AT&L)  Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 
WASP Wide-Body Airborne Sensor Platform 
WPAFB Wright-Patterson AFB 
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Appendix C. T-6 Type Certificate Data Sheet 
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION 
 
 
 
 
A00009WI 
Revision 14 
Hawker Beechcraft Corporation 
3000 
May 19, 2008 
TYPE CERTIFICATE DATA SHEET NO. A00009WI 
 
 
This Data Sheet, which is part of Type Certificate No. A00009WI prescribes conditions and limitations under which the product 
for which the Type Certificate was issued meets the airworthiness requirements of the Federal Aviation Regulations. 
 
Type Certificate Holder: Hawker Beechcraft Corporation 
9709 East Central 
Wichita, Kansas 67206 
 
Type Certificate Holder Record: Raytheon Aircraft Company transferred to 
Hawker Beechcraft Corporation on March 26, 2007 
 
I.   MODEL 3000 (U. S. Military T-6A) (ACROBATIC CATEGORY) (See note 12, for restrictions) 
APPROVED JULY 30, 1999. 
 
Engine One (1) Pratt and Whitney of Canada, Ltd. of United Technologies Corp. Pratt and 
Whitney Division PT6A-68 (turboprop). 
 
 
Fuel JP-4, JP-5, JP-8, JET-A, JET-A1, and JET-B. 
 
 
Anti-Icing Additive per MIL-I-85470 is required in concentration of .10% - .15% by 
volume. 
 
Oil (Engine and Pratt and Whitney Service Bulletin No. 18001 lists approved brand oils. 
Gearbox) 
 
Engine Limits 
 
  
Shaft 
horsepower 
 
N1 Gas Generator 
Speed ( % ) 
 
Prop Shaft 
Speed (RPM) 
Maximum 
Permissible 
Turbine Interstage 
Turbine ( Deg. C) 
Take Off 1100 104% 2000 820 
Maximum Continuous 1100 104% 2000 820 
Ground Idle - 51% min. - 750 
Starting - - - 1000 (5 sec.) 
Transient 1447 (20 sec.) 104% 2200 870 (20 sec.) 
 
All other engine limits as noted in engine TCDS E26NE 
 
Propeller and Propeller Limits One Hartzell HC-E4A–2 ( ) Hub with E9612 Blades 
Diameter: 97 Inches (Maximum): 
Minimum allowable for repair: 96 inches 
No further reduction permitted. 
Pitch Settings at: 
 
Low Pitch Stop 15.1° ± .2° 
Feathered 86 ± .5° 
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Propeller limits as per TCDS P10NE 
Maximum Operating Speed 
 
 
 
316 
Maximum Operating Mach No. 0.67 
Maximum Flap Extension Speed 147 
Landing Gear Extended 147 
Maneuvering Speed 236 
 
 
 
 
Airspeed Limits (KIAS) 
 
 
 
 
 
C.G. Range (Landing Allowable Forward C. G. Up To 5212 Lbs-F. S. 163.8 
Gear Extended Allowable Forward C. G. Up To 6200 Lbs-F. S. 164.8 
Allowable Forward C. G. Up To 6500 Lbs-F. S. 166.8 
Allowable Aft C. G. Up To 6500 Lbs-F. S. 169.4 
 
Empty WT C.G. Range F.S. 163.9 TO F.S. 165.0 
 
Maximum Weight Ramp                      6550 LBS 
Takeoff                   6500 LBS 
Landing                  6500 LBS 
Zero Fuel                5500 LBS 
 
Minimum Crew One (1) Pilot 
 
No. of Seats and Pilot ( F. S. 162.8 ) 
Loading Passenger ( F. S. 218.9 ) 
Maximum Baggage 80 Lbs. ( F. S. 271.0 ) 
 
Fuel Capacity TANK CAP. GAL. USABLE GAL. ARM 
LH  92.0  90.0 +169.9 
RH 92.0 90.0 +169.9 
See Note 1. for data on unusable and undrainable fuel. 
 
Note: Fuel tanks are interconnected and function as one tank. Fuel is free to 
flow between tanks. Total usable fuel 90.0 + 90.0 = 180 gallons. 
 
Oil Capacity 18 Quarts total at F. S. 89.4 
See Note 1. for data on undrainable oil. 
 
Maximum Operating Altitude 31,000 feet 
 
 
Control Surface Movements Rudder Right 24 ° Left 24 ° 
 
 
Rudder Tab Right 9 ° Left 9 ° 
Elevators Up 18 ° Down 16 ° 
Elevator Trim Tab Up 5.5 ° Down 22 ° 
Ailerons Up 20 ° Down 11° 
Aileron Trim Biased Centering Spring 
Wing Flap Takeoff 23 ° Landing 50 ° 
 
Speedbrake 67.5 ° 
 
Serial Nos. Eligible PT-4 and after; 
PF-1 and after (See note 10 for special information relating to serial number 
PF-3) & 
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PG-1 through PG-25 (See note 11) 
Datum Firewall Location F.S. 118.1 
 
Leveling Means Inclinometer on canopy rail measuring -6.00 degrees 
 
Certification Basis                                            FAR Part  23 effective  February 1,  1965 as amended  by Amendment  23-1 
through 23-47; FAR 23.201, 23.203, 23.207 as amended by Amendment 23-50; 
FAR Part 34 effective September 10, 1990 as amended by Amendment 34-3 
effective February 3, 1999; FAR Part 36 effective December 1, 1969, as 
amended  by  Amendment  36-21  effective  December  28,  1995;  the  Noise 
Control   Act   of   1972;   Exemption   No.   6869;   and   Special   Conditions 
23-98-03-SC and 23-98-02-SC. 
 
Equivalent Safety findings have been granted as follows: 
23.562; 23.777(d); 23.785(d); 23.807(b)(5); 23.841(b)(6); 23.1305(c)(5); and 
23.1549(b). 
 
Application for Type Certificate was dated January 15, 1996. A one (1) year 
extension of Type Certification date was granted via FAA letter dated January 
26,  1999.  The  Model  3000  Type  Certificate  was  obtained  by  Hawker 
Beechcraft Corporation under Delegation Option Procedures under authority of 
FAR Part 21,Subpart J. 
 
Production Basis Production Certificate No. PC- 8. Delegation Option Manufacturing No. 
DOA-230339-CE. S/N PT-4, PT-5 and PT-8 not Produced under PC-8. 
Authorized to issue airworthiness certificates under Delegation Option 
Procedures of Part 21 of the Federal Aviation Regulations. 
 
Equipment The basic required equipment as prescribed in applicable airworthiness 
regulations (see Certification Basis) must be installed in the aircraft for 
certification. ( See Limitations Section of FAA Approved Airplane Flight 
Manual for Kinds of Operation equipment list.) 
 
All pilots and passengers must receive Hawker Beechcraft Corporation (HBC) 
approved egress training and wear HBC approved flight apparel per the AFM. 
 
NOTE 1. Current weight and balance data, loading information and a list of equipment included in empty weight must 
be provided for each airplane at the time of original certification. 
 
(a)   Basic empty weight includes unusable fuel of 41.7 lb. at (167.7 in.) with 14.5 lb. being undrainable. 
(b)   Basic empty weight includes engine oil of 36.35 lb. at (89.4 in.) with 2.55 lb. being undrainable. 
NOTE 2. All placards required in the FAA Approved Flight Manual P/N 133-590003-5 must be installed in the 
appropriate location. 
 
NOTE 3. A mandatory retirement time for all structural components is contained in the FAA Approved Limitations 
 
Section, of the HBC Model 3000 Maintenance Manual, P/N 133-590003-7. The limitations may not be 
changed without FAA engineering approval. 
 
 
NOTE 4. Inverted flight is limited to fifteen (15) seconds. Intentional zero G is limited to 5 seconds. 
NOTE 5. Airplane must be operated in accordance with FAA Approved Airplane Flight Manual P/N 133-590003-5. 
NOTE 6. This aircraft contains a canopy fracturing system and ejection seat system that was FAA approved based on 
the Equivalent Level of Safety provisions on FAR 21.17. Due to the uniqueness of this equipment, 
corresponding Operational characteristics, and need for recurring maintenance activity, all ejection seat 
training, maintenance, and component replacement schedules must be conducted in accordance with the FAA 
approved Airworthiness Limitations Section of HBC Maintenance Manual P/N 133-590003-7. 
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NOTE 7. This aircraft incorporates design features which install components in the fire zone (forward of the firewall) 
that normally are not installed in a fire zone ( i.e. battery, nose gear actuator, tire, etc. ). These components 
required special tests and/or analysis to insure that no additional hazard was caused when exposed to the 
effects of an engine fire. Any replacement of non-original components in this area must meet original 
airworthiness requirements. 
 
NOTE 8. Prior to issuance of a U. S. Standard Airworthiness Certificate, the Model 3000 must be modified in 
accordance with HBC drawing 133-005001. 
 
NOTE 9. Model 3000 serial number PF-1 and after are defined by drawing 133-000001 for operation by the Canadian 
Military. To return to an FAA approved configuration, the airplane must be modified in accordance with 
HBC drawing 133-005001; and AFM supplements 133-590003-49, 1330590003-51, 133-590003-55 and 133- 
590003-57 are required to be inserted in the AFM (133-590003-5). 
 
NOTE 10. PF-3 is eligible for delivery with restrictions which require changing the FAA approved category from 
Acrobatic to Normal per HBC Service Instructions T-6A-0001. Airplane Flight Manual Supplement 133- 
590003-61 is required with this change. These restrictions will be in effect until the airplane is modified per 
HBC Service Instructions T-6A-0002. 
 
NOTE 11.               Model 3000 serial number PG-1 through PG-25 are defined by drawing 133-000006 for operation by the 
Greek Military. To return to a FAA approved configuration, the airplane must be modified in accordance 
with HBC 133-005001. 
 
NOTE 12. Restrictions to Acrobatic Category are defined below and in Airplane Flight Manual Supplement P/N 133- 
590003-65 for airplanes equipped with the Lori oil cooler 117-389011-1 installed per drawing 133-005001 
(Reference Note 14.) 
 
Additional Prohibited Maneuvers 
 
Intentional Zero-G or Negative G flight during or on recovery from Approved Maneuvers 
 
Slow Roll 
 
Stall Turn (Hammerhead) 
Vertical Roll 
Sustained Vertical Nose Down 
 
Knife Edge 
 
NOTE 13. Prior to issuance of a U.S. Standard Airworthiness Certificate, the Model 3000 must be modified in 
Accordance with HBC drawing 133-005001. In accordance with FAR 23.1529, Instructions for Continued 
Airworthiness acceptable to the Administrator must be available at delivery of first aircraft or issuance of a 
standard certificate of airworthiness. 
 
NOTE 14. For aircraft equipped with Stewart Warner Oil Cooler P/N 133-389029-1 (10662E) installed per drawing 
133-930002, and aircraft complying with SI T-6A-0026, Revision 1, the restrictions in AFM 
P/N 133-590003-65 and in note 12 herein do not apply. 
 
NOTE 15 .Model 3000 serial number PG-26 through PG-45 are defined by HBC drawing 133-000004 for operation by 
the Greek Military. Serials PG-26 through PG-45 are not eligible for FAA 
approval. 
 
NOTE 16. Installation of HBC Kit 133-5004 Enhanced ECS System requires installation of Kit 133-5005 Crew Oxygen 
System. Installation of the crew oxygen system requires FAA approval. 
 
NOTE 17. Company name change effective 3-26-07. The following serial numbers are manufactured under the name of 
Hawker Beechcraft Corporation: PT-358 and after. 
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Amendment 
 
 
 
Report No. 97-311 
Appendix D. AMENDMENT 
 
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT, 1982 
 
November 3, 1981. – Ordered to be printed. 
CONFERENCE REPORT 
(To accompany S.815) 
 
 
 
 
TITLE IX—GENERAL PROVISIONS 
 
REPORTS ON UNIT COSTS OF MAJOR DEFENSE SYSTEMS 
 
Sec. 917 (a)(1) The program manager (as designated by the Secretary concerned) for each major 
defense system included in the Selected Acquisition Report dated March 31, 1981, and submitted 
to Congress pursuant to section 811 of the Department of Defense Appropriation Authorization 
Act, 1976 (Public Law 94-106; 10 U.S.C. 139 note), shall submit to the Secretary concerned, 
within seven days after the end of each quarter of fiscal year 1982, a written report on the major 
defense system included in such selected acquisition report for which such manager has 
responsibility. The program manager shall include in each such report -- 
 
(A) the total program acquisition unit cost for such major defense system as of the last 
day of such quarter; and 
 
(B) in the case of a major defense system for which procurement funds are authorized to 
be appropriated by this Act, the current procurement unit cost for such major defense 
system as of the last day of such quarter. 
 
2)  If at any time during any quarter of fiscal year 1982, the program manager of a major 
defense system referred to in paragraph (1) has reasonable cause to believe that (A) the 
total program acquisition unit cost, or (B) in the case of a major defense system for which 
procurement funds are authorized to be appropriated by this Act, the current procurement 
unit cost has exceeded the applicable percentage increase specified in subsection (b), such 
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manager  shall immediately submit  to the Secretary concerned a report  containing the 
information, as of the date of such report, required by paragraph (1). 
 
3)  The program manager shall also include in each report submitted pursuant to paragraph (1) 
or (2) any change from the Selection Acquisition Report of March 31, 1981, in schedule 
milestones or system performances with respect to such system that are known, expected, 
or anticipated by such manager. 
 
(b)(1) If the Secretary concerned determines, on the basis of any report submitted to him 
pursuant to subsection (a), that the total program acquisition unit cost (including any increase 
for expected inflation) for any major defense system for which no procurement funds are 
authorized to be appropriated by this Act has increased by more than 15 percent over the total 
program acquisition unit cost for such system reflected in the Selected Acquisition Report of 
March 31, 1981, then (except as provided in paragraph (3)) no additional funds may be 
obligated in connection with such system after the end of the 30-day period beginning on the 
day on which the Secretary makes such determination. The Secretary shall notify the Congress 
promptly in writing of such increase upon making such a determination with respect to any 
such major defense system and shall include in such notice the date on which such 
determination was made. 
 
(2) If the Secretary concerned determines, on the basis of a report submitted to him pursuant to 
subsection (a), that – 
 
(A) the procurement unit cost of a major defense system for which procurement funds are 
authorized to be appropriated by this Act has increased by more than 15 percent over the 
procurement unit cost derived from the Selected Acquisition Report of March 31, 1981, 
or 
 
(B) the total program acquisition unit cost (including any increase for expected inflation) 
of such system has increased by more than 15 percent over the total program acquisition 
unit cost for such system as reflected in the Selected Acquisition Report of March 31, 
1981, or 
 
then (except as provided in paragraph (3)) no additional funds may be obligated in connection 
with such system after the end of the 30-day period on the day which the Secretary makes 
such determination. The Secretary shall notify the Congress promptly in writing of such 
increase upon making such a determination with respect to any such major defense system and 
shall include in such notice the date on which such determination was made. 
 
(3) The prohibition contained in paragraphs (1) and (2) on the obligation of funds shall not 
apply in the case of any major defense system to which such prohibition would otherwise 
apply if the Secretary concerned submits to the Congress, before the end of the 30-day period 
referred to in paragraph (1) or (2), a written report which includes – 
 
(A) a statement of the reasons for such increase in total program acquisition unit cost or 
procurement unit cost; 
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(B)  the  identities  of  the  military  and  civilian  officers  responsible   for  program 
management and cost control of the major defense system; 
 
(C) the action taken and proposed to be taken to control future cost growth of such 
system; 
 
(D) any changes made in the performance or schedule milestones of such system and the 
degree  to  which  such  changes  have  contributed  to  the  increase  in  total  program 
acquisition unit cost or procurement unit cost; 
 
(E) the identities of the principal contractors for the major defense system; and 
 
(F) an index of all testimony and documents formally provided to the Congress on the 
estimated cost of such system. 
 
(c)(1) If the Secretary concerned – 
 
(A) on the basis of a report submitted to him pursuant to subsection (a), determines (i) 
that the total program acquisition unit cost (including an increase for expected inflation) 
for a major defense system has increased by more than 25 percent over the total program 
acquisition unit cost or such system reflected in the Selected Acquisition Report of March 
31,  1981,  or  (ii)  in  the  case  of any  such  system  for  which  procurement  funds  are 
authorized to be appropriated by this Act, that the current procurement unit cost of such 
system has increased by more than 25 percent over the procurement unit cost derived 
from the Selected Acquisition Report of March 31, 1981, and 
 
(B) has submitted a report to the Congress with respect to such system pursuant to 
subsection (b)(3), 
 
then (except as provided in paragraph (2)) no additional funds may be obligated in connection 
with such system after the end of the 60-day period beginning on the day on which the Secretary 
makes such determination. 
 
(2) The prohibition contained in paragraph (1) on the obligation of funds shall not apply in the 
case of a major defense system to which such prohibition would otherwise apply if the Secretary 
of Defense submits to the Congress, before the end of the 60-day period referred to in such 
paragraph, a written certification stating that - 
 
(A) such system is essential to the national security; 
 
(B) there are no alternatives to such system which will provide equal or greater military 
capability at less cost; 
 
(C) the new estimates of the total program acquisition unit cost or procurement unit cost 
are reasonable; and 
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(D) the management structure for such major defense system is adequate to manage and 
control total program acquisition unit cost or procurement unit cost. 
 
(d) As used in this section: 
 
(1) The term “total program acquisition unit cost” means, in the case of a major defense 
system, the amount equal to (A) the total cost for development and procurement of, and 
system-specific military construction for, such system, divided by (B) the number of fully 
configured end items to be produced for such a system. 
 
(2) The term “procurement unit cost” means, in the case of a major defense system, the 
amount equal to (A) the total of all procurement funds available for such system in any 
fiscal year, divided by (B) the number of fully-configured end items to be procured with 
such funds during such fiscal year. 
 
(3) The term “Secretary concerned” has the same meaning as provided in section 101(8) 
of title 10, United States Code. 
 
(e) Section 811 of the Department of Defense Appropriation Authorization Act, 1976 (Public 
Law 94-106; 10 U.S.C. 139 note), is amended by addition at the end thereof the following new 
subsection: 
 
“(c)(1) Each report required to be submitted under subsection (a) shall include the history of the 
total program acquisition unit cost of each major defense system from the date on which funds 
were first authorized to be appropriated for such system. 
 
“(2) As used in this subsection, the term ‘total program acquisition unit cost’ means the amount 
equal to (A) the total cost for development and procurement of, and system-specific military 
construction for, a major defense system, divided by (B) the number of fully configured end 
items to be produced for such a system.” 
